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The Russian Constitutional Court:
A Third Branch of the Russian Federal Government
Jon Rodeback
The 1990s brought with them a
frantic pace of political, social, and
economic change in the Soviet Union and
Russia.
In addition to the outward
revolution of mass demonstrations, civil
wars, and the coup attempt against
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was also
experiencing an internal revolution. In
particular, perestroika was gradually
incorporating into law such Western
concepts as rule of law, separation of
powers, checks and balances, and limited
government. And these efforts were largely
paralleled on the republic level, particularly
in Russia.
Spring of 1991 brought one of the
most interesting and perhaps most important
developments in Russia: the passage and
signing into law of the "Law on RSFSR
Constitutional Court, " creating the first
Russian court with the power of judicial
In late October, the Russian
review.
Congress of People's Deputies selected and
swore in thirteen judges, and the
Constitutional Court began operating before
the end of the same year.
In its first two years, the Court has
experienced a variety of successes and
failures, from initial victories to a temporary
suspension in October following the
attempted Parliamentary coup. After two
years the questions 100m ever larger and
more urgently. How powerful and effective
is the Constitutional Court? To what extent
has it really influenced Russian government
in the past and what are its prospects for the
future?
Soviet Roots of the Judiciary
Prior to Gorbachev's reforms of the
judicial system, the phrase "Soviet justice"
was an oxymoron-at least by any Western

standard. In the Soviet Union, the USSR
Supreme Court was the highest judicial
body. Elected by the USSR Supreme Soviet
for five-year terms, members of the USSR
Supreme Court were officially independent
of the other branches of government. 1
However, the 1977 Constitution o/the USSR
made the Supreme Court directly
accountable to the Supreme Soviet (ch. 20,
art. 152). This same pattern was followed
on all levels of government (ch. 20, art.
152), and it did not favor the exercise of
justice.
The results are quite dramatic. Even
after Stalin's show trials, the system did not
significantly improve-although it may have
become less injurious to the defendants.
One study even shows that the rate of
acquittals in Soviet courts steadily decreased
from the late 1940s to the 1980s, until by
the mid-1980s "acquittals had practically
disappeared" (Solomon 1987, 531-38). Yet,
the judges did try to ease the effects of the
judicial system, by giving light sentences,
overturning appeals on technicalities, or
remanding cases for retrial after which the
cases were quietly dropped for lack of
evidence (Solomon 1987, 539-41). Hence,
the system sometimes could judge people
"guilty" but not punish them.
Such
incidents of mercy are noteworthy, but such
lenience was severely limited by the Party.
Perestroika and the Judiciary
The Gorbachev era marked a radical
change in the Soviet-and Russian-legal
and political system. At his urging, the
USSR Supreme Soviet created the USSR
Congress of People's Deputies in December
1988, which was actually elected in
pseudodemocratic elections. In the same
month, the Supreme Soviet also began an
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extensive reform of the judicial system.
Constitutional amendments extended the
terms of office of all judges to five years,
ended the popular election of judges on the
local level, and transferred power of election
to the Soviets on the level immediately
superior to the courts. During the next
year, the Congress of People's Deputies
enacted strict penalties for violating the
independence of the courts. Many of the
Soviet republics quickly followed suit by
enacting similar legislation (Butler 1992,

justices, swore in all thirteen, and tabled
selection of the remaining two justices until
the next session of Congress (Zamyatina
1991, 50). Five days later, the new Court
met and selected Valerii Zorkin as Chairman
of the Constitutional Court (Klimov and
Artemev 1991, 60).
A Comparison of Courts
Comparing the Russian Constitutional
Court to the U.S. Supreme Court reveals
some of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Russian Constitutional Court. Beyond the
basic responsibility of judicial review, their
politicians and responsibilities in the
judiciary structure and jurisdictions differ
widely.
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Court is not the ultimate
wielder of judicial power. The Russian
Supreme Court and the Russian Supreme
Court of Arbitration-carry-overs from the
Soviet era (Butler 1992, 112)-each exercise
final judgement in their own jurisdictions.
Theoretically, the Constitutional Court
considered constitutional questions, the
Supreme Court decides civil and criminal
cases, and the Supreme Court of Arbitration
resolves economic disputes. Obviously,
these jurisdictions overlap and create a
"problem of competition" among the
supreme courts, as noted by Deputy
Chairman Vitruk in the Izvestiya Case (cited
in Feofanov 1993, 26).
Additionally, while in the United
States all federal and some state courts can
exercise judicial review, in Russia the
Constitutional Court is the sole judge of
constitutionality (Sharlet 1993, 3). These
constitutional responsibilities specifically
include examining all treaties, laws, and
executive orders. The Constitutional Court
also decides disputes between the executive
and legislative branches and between
members of the Russian Federation.

112-13).
In March 1990, the Supreme Soviet
created the office of the President of the
Soviet Union and elected Gorbachev
President. He subsequently created the
Committee on Constitutional
Supervision-the Soviet forerunner of the
Russian Constitutional Court-"to ensure
that Soviet laws complied with the country's
constitution" (Benn 1992, 178-79). 2 Thus,
by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had
the beginnings of separate branches of
government, a primordial system of checks
and balances, and a judicial body to enforce
them.
Creation of the Russian Constitutional
Court
In May 1991, the Russian parliament
took a radical step, passing the "Law on
RSFSR Constitutional Court." On May 6,
the Russian Supreme Soviet passed the
original statute. After adding approximately
two hundred amendments, the Russian
Congress of People's Deputies passed the
statute. On July 12, President Yeltsin
signed it into law (Sharlet 1993, 2).
On October 27, after a series of
political turf battles, the Russian Congress
of People's Deputies (CPD) chose ten
members of the thirteen-member Russian
Constitutional Court. 3 On the following
day, the CPD selected three additional
-2-
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Notably, the Constitutional Court does not
normally adjudicate disputes between
citizens or between the citizen and the
government, as the U.S. Supreme Court
does.
Instead, it confines itself to
interpreting the constitution (Zherebenkov
1991, 68). While the U.S. Supreme Court
can sidestep constitutional issues-and often
does-by simply deciding on the specific
the
merits of the case in question;
Constitutional Court must directly confront
constitutional questions, because they are the
only questions which the court can legally
decide.
In addition, while the U.S. Supreme
Court has almost complete control over its
docket, the Constitutional Court exercises
little control over which cases it considers.
The difference lies in the different types of
jurisdictions. Currently, the U.S. Supreme
Court receives few cases of original
jurisdiction; hence, most cases arrive via
petitions for ceniorari, which the Court may
accept or dismiss at its own discretion
(O'Brien 1991,96). Conversely, most cases
reach the Constitutional Court by appeal on
original jurisdiction, so the Court must hear
them (Sharlet 1993, 3). With such an open
door to disputes, the Constitutional Court
consistently finds itself embroiled in fierce
power struggles between the branches of
government or simply overwhelmed by the
sheer number of cases. 4
However, the Constitutional Court
does have on defense to hide behind: the law
specifically forbids the Constitutional Court
to consider "political questions"
(Wishnevsky 1993, 3). (Judicial precedent
imposes a similar restraint upon the U. S.
Supreme Court.)
Of course, the line
between political and constitutional questions
is blurry at best, and since the Constitutional
Court determines what is a political
question, it could conceivably use this
loophole to control its docket. The Court
could declare undesirable case political

questions and conversely ignore the political
nature of cases which the Court wanted to
hear-a time-honored practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Until ratification of the new
constitution on December 12, 1993, the
Constitutional Court continually wrestled
with the inadequate Constitution of the
Brezhnev era. Written and ratified under
Soviet communism, it bore little relation to
the political environment in which the
Constitutional Court was working. Even
Chairman Zorkin, the strongest and most
vocal supporter of compliance with the
Brezhnev constitution, acknowledged the
paradox in having "to comply with an
obsolete Constitution" Muratov 1992, 45).
Finally, the Russian public attitude
toward the law and the courts radically
differs from the American legal tradition,
even from the earliest days of the United
States. The U.S. Supreme Court started in
1789 with the advantage of a public which
generally upheld and respected the law and
court decisions. The Russian Constitutional
Court has no such advantage, and like any
other court, it depends on the executive and
legislative branches to enforce its decisions
until it gains a reputation and a prestige that
the other branches dare not defy.
If the first few decades of the U.S.
Supreme Court teach any lesson, it is that
supreme courts walk an extremely shaky
tightrope during the first years. The first
decade saw a rapid changeover in personnel,
including three different Chief Justices. 5
During the second decade, President
Jefferson and Congress blatantly tried to
destroy the Supreme Court. With some
adroit legal maneuvering, Congress
completely canceled the Supreme Court's
1802 session. Then, in early 1802, the U.S.
House of Representatives impeached a
federal district judge and Supreme Court
Justice Samuel Chase. 6 In this volatile
environment, only Chief Justice Marshall's
-3-
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politically astute decision of Marbury v.
Madison succeeded in saving the Supreme

with the Court's decision (Shakhray 1992,
39). Having successfully stared down the
powerful Russian President, the Court had
clearly established itself as a real political
and legal force.
However, the next major case turned
into a disaster for the Constitutional Court.
In early 1992, the leaders of the Tartar
Autonomous Republic announced a public
referendum on whether Tartarstan should be
a separate state within the Russian
Federation. The Court quickly heard the
case and on March 13 declared various
sections of the referendum unconstitutional
as an attempt to secede from the
Federation. 7 But three days later, during a
special session, the Tartar parliament
defiantly chose not to alter the referendum
but simply to declare that it was not a
referendum on secession. Two days later,
Zorkin addressed the Russian parliament-as
per his Constitutional prerogative-asking
them to enforce the Court's ruling. The
parliament concurred and called upon
President Yeltsin to enforce the Court order.
However, Yeltsin ignored the parliamentary
resolution and did nothing except offer his
verbal support. Consequently, the Tartar
referendum proceeded as planned and the
Court was publicly embarrassed
(Wishnevsky 1993, 3; Sharlet 1993, 7-8).
Before the Tartar Case, the Court
had established itself as a legitimate court,
but by even hearing the Tartar Case the
Court pointlessly sacrificed much of its
newly acquired prestige. First, nationalism
is the most volatile issue in the Russian
Federation. The Constitutional court simply
does not have the power to enforce any
decision on the issue without the full support
of the legislative and executive branches,
which it never received.
Second, the
Constitutional Court acted much too hastily.
Tartarstan had not even held the referendum
before the Court ruled against it. The Court
should have at least waited until after the

Court. The Russian Constitutional Court
has not had the similar lUXUry of two
decades to gather its strength.
The Initial Decisions
Yet, with all the problems the
Constitutional Court faces, its creation could
not have been timed better. Two months
after the Court was created, President
Gorbachev resigned and the USSR Supreme
Soviet voted itself and the USSR out of
existence. The Russian Constitutional Court
wasted no time in stepping into the resulting
On December 26,
power vacuum.
1991-the same day the USSR Supreme
Soviet dissolved itself-the Court
"unanimously adopted a sensational
statement," declaring that it would "stand in
the way of dictatorship and tyranny,
whatever their source" (Orlov 1991, 43).
The same day, Chairman Zorkin announced
in a press conference that the Court would
soon examine the constitutionality of a
Presidential decree merging the two
ministries, as well as several legislative acts
of the Supreme Soviet (INTERFAX 1991b,
39).
After several quick hearings, on
January 15 the Court announced a
unanimous ruling against Yeltsin' s decree
merging the RSFSR Ministry of Security
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The
Court declared that the merger violated the
constitutional "separation of powers . . .
which gave only the legislature the power to
create ministries" (Sharlet 1993, 6). This
decisive ruling won instant praise from the
Russian media, which jubilantly declared
that "law and Russia are not two
incompatible things" (Reshetnikov 1992,
38). Yeltsin accused the Court of playing
politics instead of interpreting the
constitution, but he did grudgingly comply
-4-
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vote to consider the matter; a "no" vote
would have rendered the whole case mute.
Finally, the referendum was legally
nonbinding and an extremely politicized
issue. The Court could have-and should
have-simply declared it a "political
question" and therefore nonjusticiable.
Instead, the activist Court fought a hopeless
and useless battle which eventually damaged
its credibility.

Adding to the inherent complexity was the
complete absence of a system of Court
regulations. Hence, the trial proceeded on
a completely ad hoc basis. The Court
probably intentionally intensified the
complexity and monotony in order to defuse
the highly explosive situation. The rationale
was that if people became bored enough,
they would not even care about the final
ruling and the Court would escape relatively
unscathed (Sharlet 1993, 17).
Yet, as the trial proceeded, it
gradually became evident from the questions
and procedural votes that the justices did not
agree with each other and that the final
decision was unpredictable, which
introduced a new type of excitement and
interest. All this time, the Court-especially
Zorkin-tried to portray this trial as a
completely judicial proceeding with no hint
of "political expediency." They were only
partiall y successful. While some of the
press spoke favorably of the Court, others
referred to the trial as "a political farce"
and a "political show trial" (Sharlet 1993,
23).
The Court still might have escaped
relatively uninjured if it had not tried to
force Gorbachev to testify. When the trial
began in May, the Court subpoenaed him to
testify. He flatly refused, citing executive
immunity. In July, Gorbachev announced
that he and Chairman Zorkin had agreed that
he would not need to testify. Yet, shortly
afterwards, the rest of the Constitutional
Court overruled Zorkin and tried to force
Gorbachev to testify (thereby violating the
constitution).8 Gorbachev still refused to
appear in Court. The Court then fined
Gorbachev one hundred rubles for contempt
of court-the maximum penalty allowed by
law. The Ministry of Security and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed by
revoking Gorbachev's passport, thus
preventing him from leaving Russia. If he
did try to leave, the border police were

The CPSU Case
The Court repeated the same
mistakes with an appeal by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the
RSFSR Communist Party. Sharlet observes:
If the Russian Constitutional Court had followed its
legislative mandate, it would have invoked the "political
question" rule and avoided the CPSU case. (1993, 17)

Conversely, if the Court had succeeded in
successfully resolving the question, the
Court's prestige and power would have
taken a quantum leap forward.
Following the attempted August 1991
coup, Yeltsin had outlawed both parties by
executive decree. The parties appealed to
the Constitutional Court, and the Court
accepted the case in December 1991, but
deliberately delayed hearing the case until it
had established some sense of legitimacy-a
wise move, as far as it went. However,
during the interim, the Sixth Congress of
People's Deputies amended the 1978 RSFSR
Constitution more than two hundred times,
and one of these amendments specifically
extended the jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court to "political parties and
public associations" (Sharlet 1993, 19-20).
When the CPSU hearing finally
opened on May 26, 1992, the trial quickly
became a disappointment to the media and
spectators. They had expected a sensational
confrontation, but instead found a seemingly
endless and complex legal proceeding.
-5-
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ordered to arrest him. These illegalities
inflamed public outrage against the Court,
which eventually relented and stopped
harassing Gorbachev (Wishnevsky 1993,5).
The political maneuvering did not
end with harassing Gorbachev. During the
court proceedings, "Yeltsin bestowed on the
justices a substantial pay raise" (Sharlet
1993, 28). Then, on October 28, Yeltsin
upped the stakes by issuing a decree banning
the National Salvation Front (NSF), a
political organization of extreme nationalists,
monarchists, and communists. The Court
responded by placing the NSF appeal next
on its docket.
Finally, on November 30, the Court
issued an 11-2 decision finding that Yeltsin's
decree banning the central party
organizations of the CPSU was
constitutional.
However, the decrees
confiscating property and outlawing local
party organizations were found
unconstitutional.
The ruling represented a partial
victory to both sides-an obvious attempt to
placate both Yeltsin and the CPSU. The
dissenting justices- Luchin and Ebzdeevseverely criticized the decision as politically
expedient rather than legally sound, which is
probably an accurate evaluation (Katanyan
1992, 11-12). The spit vote and dissenting
opinions represent a serious deepening of the
rifts within the Court.

and the parliament eclipsed the importance
of the Court's ruling.
The crisis peaked on March 20,
when Yeltsin announced "special rule" by
the president. True to form, Zorkin quickly
denounced the action as unconstitutional,
and a few days later the Court reviewed
Yeltsin's speech and declared his decree
unconstitutional by a 9-3 vote. Yeltsin
consequently backed down and issued a
sterilized executive order which did not
contain any of the unconstitutional
provisions (Kasyanenko 1993, 33-34; Sharlet
1993, 32).9
Although the March crisis marked a
temporary victory for the Constitutional
Court, it left the Court ultimately weaker.
Now the Court could no longer claim
neutrality in the conflict between Yeltsin and
the parliament. Instead of thinking clearly,
Zorkin had led the Court unarmed into a
dangerous political no-man' s land.
In
addition, his denouncement of Yeltsin's
decree prior to the Court's decision was a
gross violation of his sworn neutrality as a
judge. Also, the Court made the mistake of
issuing a preemptive decision, which made
them look extremely foolish once Yeltsin
issued his sterilized decree. If the Court
had waited until Yeltsin actually issued the
order, they could have avoided
embarrassment and might not have had to
consider the issue.
However, once drawn into the fray,
the Court faced increasing political pressure
during the summer. The Court and its
members had been bothered by threats and
security breaches since their first ruling in
1992 (Muratov 1992, 44-45). After the
March incident, Yeltsin did his best to
exploit the Court's dependence on the
executive branch.
In June, Chairman
Zorkin was deprived of his official car, his
portable phone, and his state dacha. Next,
Yeltsin directed the Main Security
Directorate to stop guarding the Court's

The 1993 Decision and Power Politics
On January 15, the Court began
hearings on the NSF case, but initially two
justices- Ametistov and Kononovboycotted the hearings. In spite of the
initial delays and divisions among the
justices, the Court quickly decided the case
finding Yeltsin' s decree unconstitutional.
However, by this time-mid-February-the
power-sharing agreement was collapsing,
and the escalating conflict between Yeltsin
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building,
the judges, and their
families-leaving
them completely
unprotected in what had become a dangerous
city. Finally, the state information agency
ITAR-TASS simply refused to distribute
official Constitutional Court documents
(Kravtsov 1993, 29-30).
Then, on September 22, President
Yeltsin unconstitutionally dissolved the
Congress of People's Deputies and the
Supreme Soviet. Ironically, in the same
speech Yeltsin admitted that his actions were
unconstitutional but justified them with
political necessity (Yeltsin 1993b, 8-9).
Predictably, Zorkin immediately and
unequivocally denounced Yeltsin's action
and then led a deeply divided Court in
overturning Ye1tsin's decrees. However,
within a week Zorkin had "backtracked on
his previous uncompromising criticism of
Yeltsin's actions" and was seeking some
sort of compromise arrangement (Slater
1993a-1993b).
Zorkin's efforts to broker a second
agreement failed, and government forces
were eventually forced to crush the
parliamentary uprising.
Shortly after
regaining control, Yeltsin publicly blamed
the Constitutional Court for inciting the
violence (Yeltsin 1993a, 37-38).
He
subsequently suspended the Constitutional
Court until after the December elections and
forced Chairman Zorkin to resign (Teague
1993; Tolz and Wishnevsky 1993).

People's Deputies, Zorkin successfully
brokered a power-sharing agreement
between Yeltsin and parliament (Wishnevsky
1993, 7-8). This incredible success instantly
made him extremely popular with the
general public. Some of the press even
referred to him as the "Man of the Year,"
and a public opinion poll in early 1993
named him as the fifth most powerful
politician (Sharlet 1993, 31).
Yet, at the same time his actions
were dividing the members of the
Constitutional Court. As time progressed,
Zorkin became even more involved in
politics. Deputy Chairman Vitruk critically
observed, "It has become almost the norm
for Constitutional Court Chairman V.
Zorkin to appear in the mass media and to
make political statements and assessments at
meetings of various kinds" (Feofanov 1993,
26). For 1992 and the first half of 1993,
FBIS reports alone include over forty
statements by Zorkin to the press, and few
of them directly relate to his responsibilities
as Chairman of the Constitutional Court. 10
Particularly annoying was Zorkin's habit of
preempting the Court-stating his opinion on
a case before the Court even heard it.
About Zorkin's unprofessionalism, Deputy
Chairman Vitruk appropriately advised, "If
you want to be a politician, take off your
judge's gown" (Feofanov 1993, 27).

Chairman Zorkin

Considering the political and social
environment in which the Constitutional
Court was born, the Court has not done
poorly in its first two years. The Court has
definitely increased its own prestige and
power and also that of the entire judicial
system. Its huge caseloadll shows this.
However, this increased power has also
increased the stakes in the political games it
plays.

Conclusion

The rise and fall of Chairman Zorkin
itself sheds some light on the Court.
Following the CPSU decision, Zorkin
became deeply involved in mediating the
growing dispute between Yeltsin and
parliament.
Even then-December
1992-rumors of disbanding parliament were
circulating.
Yet somehow, during the
December session of the Congress of
-7-
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The first decision firmly established
the legitimacy and power of the Court, but
some of the subsequent decisions seriously
injured the Court. The biggest failing of the
Court to date has been its excessive
activism. In such an unstable constitutional
environment as the Russian Federation,
judicial activism will eventually backfire.
And when it does backfire, the very
existence of the Court is in danger-as the
events of October 1993 vividly illustrate.
The Court should never have considered the
Tartarstan case and probably should not
have accepted the CPSU appeal. While
most of its decisions were legally defensible,
they were not politically wise. The Court
has yet to learn that it cannot make judicial
decisions in a political vacuum.
The Court should instead conserve its
political capital for the most critical cases,
and otherwise decide only routine matters.
The Court cannot rely solely on legal
idealism; it is a quick form of political
suicide. Until the Court has developed a
strong reputation and sense of legitimacy in
Russia, the Court should avoid conflicts
between the executive and legislative
branches as much as possible by doing as
little as possible.
While Chairman Zorkin did show
skill in negotiating the December 1992
power-sharing agreement, his political

grandstanding has seriously damaged the
Court's image and divided the justices. By
forcing him to resign, Yeltsin has probably
unwittingly strengthened the Court in the
long run.
Finally, recent events suggest the
Court will become pro-Yeltsin and will
consequently do little to contradict his will.
The recently-ratified Constitution
conveniently allows Yeltsin to immediately
appoint at least seven more judges to the
Court to expand its number to nineteen. 12
Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt would
have been envious of this court-packing
scheme. Presumably, Yeltsin will succeed
in taming the Court in the short term. Yet,
the fact that Yeltsin even included provisions
in the new Constitution which preserve the
Constitutional Court suggests that the Court
is already too powerful for Yeltsin to
completely disband it, which he certainly
would not object to doing-the Court has
caused him much grief since its inception.
Hence in the next few years the new
Constitutional Court will probably exercise
significantly less independence from the
executive branch, but it will also be
protected by the executive branch. In such
a position, the Court could conceivably
evolve into a truly independent branch of
government over the next few decades.
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NOTES
1. The law specifically states that the "judges . . . of USSR Supreme Court are independent
and subordinate only to the law" (Law on the USSR Supreme Court 1980, 14).
2. The USSR Committee of Constitutional Supervision was not particularly effective during
its short existence. The Russian Constitutional Court even referred to its "sad fate" in a
press release (INTERFAX 1991a, 39).
3. The first ten members of the Court were Nikolay V. Vitruk, N. T. Vedernikov, Valerii.
D. Zorkin, T. D. Morshchakova, V. 1. Oleynik, Yu. D. Rudkin, N. V. Selezhev, O. 1.
Tiunov, B. S. Ebveyev, and Ernest M. Ametistov (TASS International Service 1991, 67).
4. Sharlet notes that by the end of 1992 the Constitutional Court had decided only nine cases
but resolved approximately sixteen thousand complaints (1993, 8).
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5. Chief Justice John Jay (1789-95) resigned in 1995 to become an envoy to England, and
when he returned, he refused a second appointment as chief justice. Chief Justice John
Rutledge resigned without ever sitting on the Court. Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth (179618(0) served an unremarkable five years (O'Brien 1991, 30; Gunther 1991 Bl).
6. In March 1804, the U.S. Senate removed Federal District Judge John Pickering from
office. In 1805, Justice Chase barely survived the Senate vote. If Justice Chase had been
removed, other impeachments and removals would certainly have followed (Gunther 1991,
11).
7. Justice Ernest Ametistov dissented, arguing that the referendum was merely an exercise
of the "universally recognized right of nations to self-determination" (Wishnevsky 1993,
3)-an explosive doctrine in a multination-state like Russia.
8. "Article 67 of the Russian Constitution prohibits the forcing of any person to give
evidence that could be used against him at a criminal trial" (Wishnevsky 1993, 4).
9. Based on the Court's ruling, the Congress of People's Deputies tried and failed to
impeach Yeltsin.
10. The examples of U.S. Supreme Court justices sharply contrast with Zorkin's flamboyant
style. Supreme Court justices lead extremely quiet lives and rarely make public statements
outside of their court opinions.
11. During spring of 1992, Zorkin reported that the Court was receiving "hundreds of
[individual] complaints" every day. At the end of 1992, the Russian Constitutional Court
had decided nine cases and "settled approximately 16,000 complaints" (Sharlet 1993, 8).
12. The Draft Constitution of the Russian Federation expands the number of justices on the
Constitutional court to nineteen. With Zorkin's resignation and the previous two vacancies,
Yeltsin can immediately appoint seven new justices (see Art. 83 and 125).

-11-

America's Drug War: The Need and Requirements for
Cultural Change
Mason Barlow
Introduction

makers.
While government initiatives
against both supply and demand may be
helpful in the ultimate mix, the only lasting
solution will come about from a broad-based
cultural ethos against drug use.

We've got a war on our hands . ... We've
got to get real and do whatever it takes to
provide safety.
Washington D.C. Mayor
Sharon Pratt Kelly

War on Drugs

Over the last few years, a terrible
"rage of violence," as described by the
Reverend Jesse Jackson, has swept
Washington, D.C. There were 489 murders
in 1991, 451 in 1992 (New York Times
1993, AI4), and 466 in 1993 (Lewis and
Wheeler 1994, AlO).
Seemingly
overwhelming, the fight against drugs and
crime has created an atmosphere of
desperation in urban America.
Not limited to America's major
cities, increased drug and gang activity has
spread to small and mid-size cities.
Substance abuse penetrates all regions and
segments of our society.
A solution to America's drug problem has
so far escaped policy makers. The much
trumpeted "war on drugs," initiated by the
Reagan Administration to reduce supply, is
now generally considered a failure.
Demand reduction efforts, primarily
prevention and treatment, demonstrate only
marginal success.
The drug culture
continues to permeate the most vulnerable
segments of American society, threatening
the very institutions that preserve peace and
order.
In light of America's political and
cultural tradition, this article explores the
need and requirements for developing a
cultural ethos against drug abuse. The longterm solution to America's drug problem
lies beyond the reach of government policy-

War on Supply
In February 1982 President Ronald
Reagan declared a "war on drugs." This
effort focused primarily on supply-side
strategies to stop illicit drugs from entering
the United States.
Responding to
Congressional pressure, President Reagan
signed a National Security Decision
Directive in April 1986, declaring
narcotrafficking a "lethal" threat to U. S.
national security and opening the door for
greater military involvement (Smith 1992,
131).
Military resources focused on
primarily interdiction and the support of
source countries in their eradication and
enforcement efforts. This strategy yielded
only marginal results.
Operation Blast
Furnace, for example, succeeded in
temporarily lowering the price of Bolivian
coca leaves, but failed to slow the flow of
cocaine to the United States. Bruce M.
Bagley sums up the failure:
Despite the decline in leaf prices and the parallel
decline in cocaine refining in Bolivia during
Operation Blast Furnace, however, there was no
discernible impact on the availability of cocaine in the
United States, and coca leaf prices rapidly rebounded
to pre-Blast Furnace levels after U.S. forces
withdrew in November 1986. (Smith 1992, 136)

-12-

Barlow -- America's Drug War

In an earlier article, Bagley
summarized the disappointing fruits of
President Reagan's "war on drugs:"

145). At the end of his volume Drugs and
Crime, James Q. Wilson concludes "I
.
'
beheve that every contributor to this volume
agrees that significant reductions in drug
abuse will come only from reducing the
demand for those drugs" (Tonry 1990,534).
Emphasizing the need for global
cooperation, Stephen E. Flynn recognizes,
"In the long run, reducing global demand is
the only truly effective way to suppress the
transnational drug trade and the traffickers
who profit from it" (Flynn 1993, 22). And
LaMond Tullis concludes, "It seems quite
clear that policy makers must face the
reality that their domestic drug consumption
problem is primarily an internal matter and
that the solution for it must ultimately be
found within the borders of their own
countries" (Tullis 1991, 222).
This consensus behind a demand-side
solution does not negate the need or
usefulness of all supply-side efforts.
Indeed, some may prove helpful or essential
in the overall mix. But clearly any longterm solution to drug abuse must emphasize
demand reduction if it is to succeed.
Despite this widespread consensus
among experts, public policy has changed
little. After indicating it might reverse the
Bush Administration drug policy, the
Clinton Administration will now only make
minor changes in this year's budget. The
Pentagon budget proposes a 6 to 11 percent
spending cut in interception efforts, which
now account for 71 percent of its $1.17
billion anti-drug budget. It would also
increase spending by 5 percent on training
and equipment for countries that grow,
refine and export illegal drugs to 16 percent
of the total budget.
Comments Peter
Reuter, director of drug policy research at
the Rand Corporation, "They're taking
money out of interdiction, which is good.
But they're moving it to an area that I think
is even less promising: helping governments
that don't want to be helped." This year's

Illicit drugs of all types were more readily available
and cheaper in the United States in January 1989 than
~ey had been at the outset of the Reagan Presidency
ill 1981. Drug use and abuse in U.S. society had
increased dramatically over the 1980's, and the U.S.
drug market remained the biggest and most lucrative
in the world. Drug-related crimes and violence had
reached epidemic proportions and in many U.S.
cities, were greatly exacerbated by the introduction
and rapid spread of a highly addictive form of
cocaine known as "crack.· (Bagley 1988)

Declaring "this scourge will end,"
President George Bush increased the
militarization of the drug war, culminating
in the 1989 invasion of Panama and the
arrest of its president for drug trafficking.
In 1990, 75 percent of the $28 billion drug
control budget was spent on enforcement
(Reuter 1992, 21), yet these efforts did not
prevent cocaine from reaching U.S. streets.
After a decade of watching the "war
on drugs" in action with its emphasis on
supply-side strategies, experts are now in
general agreement that any meaningful
solution to the problem must reduce the
U.S. demand for illicit narcotics. Peter H.
Smith concludes, "Ultimately, it is decline
in demand that will bring about a decline in
supply" (Smith 1992, 16). Perhaps learning
a lesson from Operation Blast Furnace,
Miguel Ruiz-Cabanas argues "Without
demand reduction, the result will be clear:
a simple substitution of suppliers" (160).
After an exhaustive study of "Bolivia and
Coca," James Painter concludes, "Only
demand-side solutions . . . will work to
reduce the cocaine trade" (painter 1994,
145). Bruce M. Bagley concurs: "Unless
the United States addresses the demand side
of the equation--thereby reducing the
profitability of drug trafficking--supply-side
efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean
may ultimately prove fruitless" (Smith 1992,
-13-
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Clinton budget reflects no significant change
from the Bush budget, distributing 65
percent for law enforcement and 35 percent
for health measures (Treaster 1993, A4).
Any future move toward a demand-oriented
policy will certainly arouse opposition from
those with a stake in the current policy
(Thoumi 1993, 474).

However, the only effective preventive
methods are school-based approaches
anchored in social learning and problem
behavior theories (510). So far, prevention
efforts have been generally ineffective,
though recently there appears to be marginal
progress.
Attempts to reduce demand through
treatment have also shown mixed results.
As of 1987, 90 percent of all patients
participated in four major varieties of
treatment:
1) outpatient methadone
maintenance, 2) detoxification, 3)
therapeutic communities, and 4) outpatient
drug-free programs (397).
Retention and funding have been the
two major problems in treatment efforts.
While significantly decreasing both heroin
use and criminality, methadone maintenance
programs suffer from a low retention rate.
Only 17 percent of entrants remain in the
programs after six months, 10 percent after
Of those addicts who
a year (418).
complete treatment m methadone
maintenance, as well as therapeutic
communities, two-thirds relapse within a
year (48).
Outpatient drug-free programs were
the least successful in reducing drug use.
After one week, 21 percent of patients drop
out, 36 percent after one month, and 60
percent by three months. Although 45
percent of the patients reduce their use, onethird engage in equal or increased drug use
(423).
In addition, "crack" poses a special
challenge, as described by Bruce D.
Johnson:

War on Demand
Demand-reduction efforts attempt to
"dissuade, discourage, or deter individuals
from either using drugs or desiring to use
drugs" (Tonry 1990, 464). Thus these
efforts have centered on prevention,
treatment, and increasing the costs of drug
use (534).
Before exploring the
requirements of creating a strong cultural
ethos against drug use, we should look at
the effectiveness of these traditional tactics
of reducing demand.
Traditional prevention strategies primarily
target youth and are categorized thus: 1)
information-dissemination, 2) affectiveeducation, 3) alternatives, 4) social
resistance-skills, and 5) social resistanceskills training emphasizing personal and
social skills training (473).
Despite proliferating over two
decades, school-based education programs
emphasizing the consequences of substance
abuse have proven ineffective as a deterrent
strategy. Studies now show that increased
knowledge has "virtually no impact" on
prevention (487). In fact, some evidence
suggests that" 'Drug education' has probably
increased experimentation and tampering
with illicit drugs more than deterred it"
(Tullis 1991, 225).
This realization has led to a new
generation of programs based on 1)
advanced understanding of psychosocial
influences, 2) popular theories on behavior,
3) well-tested intervention methods, and 4)
rigorous evaluations (Tonry 1990, 463).

The only "treatment" that consistently rehabilitates
crack users is total abstinence from all drugs, but
those who abstain are a distinct minority. Even
programs designed for middle-class and employed
working-class crack users have dismal outcomes.
Over 80 percent relapse to crack and other drug use
within a year, most within 30 days of treatment exit.
While a variety of experimental treatments are
underway, the current prognosis for finding a
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treatment that can keep the one-year relapse statistic
under 50 percent appears distant. (Tonry 1990, 48)

produced only marginal results. Clearly,
treatment efforts can have a sizeable impact,
but lack sufficient funds. Even if a fully
funded national treatment effort only "cures"
20 percent of the nation's addicts, it would
be a remarkable achievement given our
unimpressive results to date. Nevertheless,
any solution to America's drug problem
must succeed in preventing new people from
joining the drug culture. LaMond Tullis
contends, "The best long-term prospects lie
in value initiatives that are credible" (Tullis
1991, 224). Until we significantly reduce
the number of people who become drug
users , both casual and hard-core, we will be
playing catch-up.

For all treatment programs, the length of
time in treatment is the best predictor of a
successful outcome (5).
Other integral
program characteristics include flexibility,
regular evaluation, and a controlled setting
(442-3). The addict's social background
also impacts the likelihood of success. For
example, criminals and urban homeless are
especially likely to drop out of treatment and
relapse rapidly to heroin, cocaine, and crack
(48). Legal compulsion appears to be the
one variable that increases retention (537).
Nevertheless, there are waiting lists
to enter treatment programs, which are
seriously underfunded. In New York City,
for example, there are between 500,000 and
600,000 hard-core drug users with only
55,000 publicly fmanced treatment slots. Of
these slots, 34,000 are in methadone
programs for helping the 200,000 heroin
addicts, leaving about 20,000 slots for
cocaine and crack addicts. Two-thirds of
these slots are in out-patient clinics, leaving
only 6,000 slots in residential centers that
provide up to two years intensive care for
hard-core addicts (Massing 1993, A15).
These figures demonstrate the serious lack
of funding of drug treatment efforts, one of
the few effective efforts in the drug war.
Last, strategies to increase the
individual cost of drug use have raised
controversy. Studies have shown that drug
testing, under proper circumstances, may
reduce drug use. In the U.S. Navy, a 1981
survey showed that 48 percent of all enlisted
personnel under twenty-five years were drug
users. In the late 1980s, after drug testing
was implemented, that number dropped to 5
percent (Tonry 1990, 540). While
widespread testing could have a supposed
positive effect by demonstrating society's
intolerance of drug use, there remain to be
resolved ethical, legal, and cost issues (541).
In the end, the war on demand has

Theoretical Framework
In exploring the requirements of
promoting a strong cultural ethos against
drug use, we must explain how general
patterns of behavior change in American
society. As we do this, we must sensitize
ourselves to the differences between
American society in general and the specific
subcultures where drug use appears most
prevalent, such as the urban "underclass."
As we ask how cultural behavior changes in
society generally, we should also consider
whether the answer holds true for those
communities caught up in the drug culture.
We mayor may not find that what holds
true for American society in general holds
true for smaller subcultures within American
society.
A brief discussion of mankind's
moral reasoning will help us understand
patterns of behavior in America.
Utilitarians and cultural relativists contend
that morality is learned and that man is born
a tabula rasa. Anthropologist Robin Fox
answers their argument well:
If, indeed, everything is learned, then surely men can
be taught to live in any kind of society. Man is at
the mercy of all the tyrants who think they know
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what is best for him. And how can he plead that
they are being inhuman if he doesn't know what
being human is in the first place. (Fox 1973, 13)

James Q. Wilson asserts that, with
few exceptions, all humans are born with a
"moral sense."
He offers an instructive
definition of this "natural" endowment:
By moral sense I mean a directly felt impression of
some standards by which we ought to judge voluntary
action. The standards are usually general and
imprecise. Hence, when I say that people have a
moral sense, I do not wish to be understood as saying
that they have an intuitive knowledge of moral rules.
Moral rules are often disputed and often in conflict;
but the process by which people resolve those
disputes or settle those conflicts leads them back to
sentiments that seem to them to have a worth that is
intuitively obvious. These sentiments constitute the
fundamental glue of society, a glue with adhesive
power that is imperfect but sufficient to explain the
social order to some degree. (Wilson 1992)

According to Wilson, humans
respond intuitively to moral sentiments.
While moral rules need to be taught and
reinforced, our natural "moral sense" exists
from birth.
Voluntary behavior responds to the
internalization of moral codes or rules.
Internalization takes place as we learn the
moral rules and are held accountable for
obeying them. Implicit or explicit, the most
effective teaching method is by example.
Moral values or codes are primarily
transmitted in American society by
institutions of moral instruction and
authority. These "transmitters" of moral
guidance interact with our moral center and
over time help us to internalize the moral
rules of society. "Transmitters" do not
"create" morality; they instead explain it and
These
hold us accountable for it.
"transmitters" include the family, church,
and school, among others (Vetterli 1987,
52). These institutions are not all equally
important, but all influence the formation of
an individual's moral code and therefore

behavior.
Not only should institutions of moral
instruction be identified, but also values that
contribute to the formation of a cultural
ethos against drug use. We must identify
the values adopted that lead to drug use and
counteract them with values that most
effectively discourage that behavior. Not all
values are equally strong in discouraging
drug abuse. To be most effective, they
should not be foreign to American culture,
but rather be found in the American cultural
tradition.
Ultimately, cultural change depends
on the health of these institutions and the
effective transmission of appropriate values.
These institutions are societal leaders who
highlight which cultural values are
important. Without shared values, society
becomes immobilized, as its members
question each other's intentions (Hawkins
1993). If these institutions break down,
society loses its moral direction and faces
problems such as widespread drug use,
crime, and illegitimacy. Thus to explore the
requirements of developing a new cultural
- ethos against drug use, we must assess the
health of the institutions of moral authority
and determine what shared values need to be
highlighted as an effective counterbalance to
drug use.
Institutions

Cultural change depends on the
health and strength of the institutions
traditionally responsible for the transmission
of moral codes. If these "transmitters" are
weak, moral norms and pro social standards
of behavior suffer, as new generations fail
to internalize them and adopt them as their
own. In addition, if these moral codes are
not reinforced continuously, the older
generation, that may have internalized them
in their youth, may gradually abandon them.
These institutions perpetuate the pro-social,
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moral behavior that contributes to orderly
society.
Richard Vetterli identifies the
"family, school, churches, neighborhood,
and other local institutions" as the "primary
feeders and simulators of the general civil
religion" (Vetterli 1987, 52), defined
broadly, as "a people's or a nation's
'official' or generally accepted dogmas,
symbols, traditions, rituals, and practices,
inherited and reinforced by various forms
and methods of indoctrination and
socialization" (95).
Sociologist Robin Williams
observes that "every functioning society has,
. to an important degree, a 'common
religion'" (Williams 1951, 312).
Anthropologist Ruth Benedict agrees: "What
really binds men together" in society "is
their culture-the ideas and the standards
they have in common" (Benedict 1961, 16).
The common values, norms, and standards
of behavior are the glue that holds society
together.
These institutions- family,
church, and school- play the vital role of
identifying, explaining, and holding people
accountable to the shared morality. While
not equally influential, these institutions
interact with one another, contributing to the
development of the cultural ethos.

brief glance at the statistics clearly indicates
that something is awry. Nationwide, 30
percent of all babies are born out of
wedlock, compared to 5 percent in 1960.
Urban communities, where the drug problem
seems especially acute, experience a high
rate of illegitimate births: 71 percent in
Detroit, 66 percent in Washington, D.C.,
and 45 percent in New York City. By the
year 2000, the overall figure for the United
States could exceed 40 percent (Clymer
1993, AI2). The divorce rate has more
than doubled between 1960 and 1980,
resulting in half of today's first marriages
eventually ending in divorce. In 1970, 12
percent of American children lived in homes
headed by single mothers; today it is almost
one in four. Comments Jonathan Rauch,
"The rise of single parenthood is, almost
certainly, the most far-reaching change in
American life in this century. Not for years
will the effects be fully fathomed." Already
the link to poverty is undeniable: children
living in fatherless homes are five times
more likely to be poor, with nearly 75
percent experiencing poverty before
adulthood (Rauch 1992, 22). Clearly the
family unit has many challenges to its
stability today.
Drug abuse within the family
significantly weakens the family as a
nurturer and transmitter of moral rules.
Bruce D. Johnson et al. make this
assessment:

Family
Traditionally the most effective
"transmitter" of moral guidance, the family
plays a role that no other institution can
play.
Through parental example and
instruction, children internalize moral codes.
They learn society's expectations and
standards, as well as their responsibilities in
society. Through daily interactions with
family members, children learn to
distinguish good from bad behavior,
associating rewards with good behavior and
punishments with bad behavior. Today the
health of the family, as a primary
transmitter of moral values, is in doubt. A

Hard-drug abuse may badly damage or end
relationships among family members.
Companionship and sexual pleasure between adults
decline due to drug consumption. Time spent with
children frequently ends; the abuser's erratic and
unreliable behavior undermines parent and child
relationships. Once out of the household, the male
drug abuser rarely has contact with his children,
although female addicts may try to maintain contact.
In short, cocaine-heroin abuse (unlike alcoholism and
daily marijuana use) severely and rapidly undermines,
if not destroys, the family as an economic and
affective unit. (Tonry 1990, 54)

-17-

Pi Sigma Alpha Review - 1994

Evidence of this is found in New
York City, where over 10 percent of babies
born test positive for cocaine. "A sizeable
proportion of them," state Johnson et al.,
"are abandoned by their mothers before
leaving the hospital and are never
reclaimed," contributing to the growing
number of children born to "no parent"
families. "That is," they continue, "no
natural parent of the child is responsible
enough to raise the offspring; few or no
members of the child's kin network are
willing to assume this responsibility" (55).
Gilbert J. Botvin argues:

cards through black churches pledging
parents to take their children to school, meet
their teachers, read their children's report
cards and turn off their TV s at home at least
three hours every night (Sullivan 1993,
A14).
These measures represent a general
concern that parents are failing in their
traditional roles as providers of moral
guidance for their children. Any long-term
solution to the drug problem must reverse
the decline of the American family as a
"transmitter" of moral instruction and
accountability.
The success of a new
cultural ethos against drugs requires an
improvement in the condition of the family,
so that it may serve in its traditional role of
socializing children with the positive values
and norms of the community.

By far, the strongest factors associated with substance
use/abuse concern both the behavior and attitudes of
significant others such as parents, older siblings, and
friends. Individuals who have family members or
friends who are substance users have a significantly
increased risk of becoming substance users
themselves. (Tonry 1990, 466)

Church

Clearly, the moral environment of the home
influences child behavior for good or bad.
Children generally learn how to live or how
not to live life from their parents by word as
well as observation.
Some suggest that families have
"dropped the ball," leaving children in a
"moral vacuum" at home (Peterson 1992,
lOD). A controversial new bill before the
New Jersey State Legislature reflects a
growing concern that parents are shying
away from their traditional responsibilities to
their children.
The bill would subject
parents to a "petty disorderly persons
conviction" if their child has ten or more
unexcused absences in a school year and
would fine them $25 for the first offense
and $100 for subsequent offenses up to a
maximum $500, thirty days imprisonment,
or both (Gray 1992, B4). Jesse Jackson has
also recognized a need for greater parental
responsibility, developing a plan to mobilize
parents through a new church-based
program. The program would distribute

Among institutions, the church plays
a vital role in the transmission of moral
rules from one generation to the next. Said
Richard and Shirley Jessor:
Among the institutions of society most clearly
identified with conservation of traditional values and
the maintenance of conventional standards of conduct,
the church is perhaps preeminent, and much of
religious doctrine is directly concerned with morality
and with sanctions against transgression.

The influence of the church is not
limited to the worship service, but extends
to other institutions, including the family.
The Jessors continue:
The socialization "reach" of the church as an
institution extends well beyond its direct contact with
those who attend services or participate in church
schools; its doctrines are often transmitted within the
family context by parents who serve, either explicitly
or by example of their religious commitment and
identification, to reinforce the teachings of their
religion. Thus religious socialization is intimately
connected with family socialization. (1977,217-18)
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government but run by local churches
(Associated Press 1993, Al3).
In Washington, D.C., the
Metropolitan Baptist church purchased most
of the row houses on its block, including a
deli. The church cleaned up the block,
ousting the drugs, alcohol, cigarettes and
lottery tickets.
Metropolitan's senior
minister, the Reverend H. Beecher Hicks Jr.
said, "We need to set an example for what
is good and clean and wholesome in our
communities. If the church cannot do it, no
one can" (Goodstein 1993, Bl).
The importance of the church in the
fight against drugs cannot be overstated.
Individuals who are highly religious are less
likely to engage in drug abuse. Said Jessor
and Jessor:

The interplay between church and family
contributes significantly to the creation of
the American cultural ethos.
Religion is made up of "beliefs" and
"rites." Beliefs are the "state of opinion"
(Durkheim 1975, 113); rites are "rules of
conduct that prescribe how man must behave
in relation to sacred things" (117). These
common beliefs and rites "unite into one
single moral community called a church all
those who adhere to them" (123). Religion,
by its moral rules and authority, is a major
influence on personal behavior, as well as
the cultural ethos.
Among American institutions, none
"did so much with so little as the black
church. " African Americans historically
have treasured the black church for
addressing both their secular and sacred
interests (Berry and Blassingame 1982,
105). In his classic study The Philadelphia
Negro (1899), W. E. B. Du Bois identified
the many secular endeavors of the black
church:

Religiosity was shown to function as an important
personal control against deviant behavior, and church
attendance was shown to be inversely related to
engagement in a variety of problem or transition
behaviors [including drug use). (1977,218)

The degree of "religiosity" or
"fundamentalism" or "orthodoxy," of
course, influences the degree to which
individuals tolerate transgression.
According to the April 1993 Gallup
Poll Monthly, 59 percent of all Americans
said religion was "very" important to them,
32 percent said "fairly," and 9 percent said
"not very." Among urban communities,
where drug abuse has hit hardest, the
response was close with 62 percent saying
"very," 29 percent "fairly," and 9 percent
"not very."
Among the non-college
educated, 64 percent said "very," 29 percent
"fairly," and 7 percent "not very." Among
low income individuals, earning less than
$20,000 a year, 66 percent said "very," 28
percent "fairly," and 6 percent "not very."
Finally, among non-whites, 80 percent said
religion was "very" important to them, 16
percent said "fairly," and only 4 percent
said "not very" (Newport 1993, 43). This

All movements for social betterment are apt to centre in
the churches. Beneficial societies in endless number are
formed here; secret societies keep in touch; co-operative
and building associations have lately sprung up; the
minister often acts as an employment agent;
considerable charitable and relief work is done and
special meetings held to aid special projects. (Berry and
Blassingame 1982, 105)

Today, the black church continues to fulfill
this role. With roots in the civil rights
movement, the church continues to fight for
social justice as well as the spiritual wellbeing of the black community.
Not surprising given its historic role
in the black community, the church is one of
the first institutions that is turned to for
addressing the plague of drugs and violence.
Many efforts are being made in the religious
community, from preachers on the corner in
drug infested neighborhoods of Washington,
D.C., to Hope in Youth, a new multimillion
dollar program in Los Angeles, funded by
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poll reveals that the most religious
communities are found among the nonwhite, urban, low-income, non-college
educated sectors of American
society-traditionally considered the most
vulnerable community to drug abuse. Thus
the church plays a potentially influential role
among the disadvantaged.
Seventy-one percent of Americans
claim to be a member of a church or
synagogue, with 41 percent attending during
the past week (Newport 1993, 37). Clearly,
few institutions touch the lives of so many
Americans and have such a powerful
influence on individual moral development.
The tenets of Christianity, Judaism,
Islam, and certainly other religions contain
moral codes that concern substance abuse.
Among Americans, 88 percent identify
themselves with a Christian religion, 2
percent with Judaism, and 1 percent with
Islam. Only 5 percent do not identify
themselves with any religion (Newport
1993, 36). Thus between 91 and 95 percent
of Americans already associate themselves
with a religion that speaks or can speak to
substance abuse. Given its traditional place
and moral authority in American society, the
church must play an important role in the
development of a strong cultural ethos
against drug abuse.

ever dreamed that values could be capsulized and
taught in a one-hour classroom session.

Beginning in the late sixties through
the seventies, most schools changed from
character education to "decision making" or
"values clarification" education, based on
the idea that schools should not push certain
values, but rather teach "relativism," or the
belief that all values are equal and that no
one can say what is right or wrong. This
educational philosophy taught decisionmaking skills to help the children determine
what values would be best for them
(McCabe 1992, 32). James Q. Wilson
observes:
Education is, of course, a moral endeavor. It is not
and never was simply a form of practical instruction.
This does not mean teachers and professors must
announce moral precepts. That's not the way we
learn morality.
They must organize a moral
environment in which right behavior is rewarded and
wrong behavior is punished and people learn respect,
duty, and obligation and if that is imposing moral
views, I say that is what education is about. (Wilson
1993)

For the past twenty years or so, public
schools have undermined the moral
instruction taught at home and at church by
teaching relativism.
Only recently, schools have begun to
turn back toward character-based education.
School systems in Utah, Atlanta, Oregon
and Virginia have changed approaches with
good results. In Oregon, for example, a
school district has implemented a four-year
curriculum emphasizing different virtues,
such as honesty, integrity, and respect, each
year. The curriculum includes the study of
people who have exhibited a particular
virtue and guidance on how to put a virtue
into practice (McCabe 1992, 32).
Although school plays an important
role in the transmission of moral codes to
youth, it is unfair to expect it to succeed
without vigilant and supportive parents. As

School
Another traditional "transmitter" of
moral instruction and authority is the school.
Through most of American history, schools
focused on the development of moral
character, along with reading, writing, and
arithmetic. Comments William Kilpatrick:
The emphasis was not on taking a stand on a issue
but on building good habits of behavior. Morality
wasn't just in your mind in an abstract way but it was
wired into your very being through practice and
habit. It wasn't a curriculum or a course but a
general approach to life. Before the '60s, no one
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interest rightly understood." Defined as
liberal individualism tempered by republican
virtue, "self-interest rightly understood"
reflects the American Founders' concern
that this free society embrace virtue as a
necessary bulwark against self-destructive
self-interest. Said de Tocqueville:

noted earlier, these institutions interact. Just
as the family's efforts are hurt if the school
undermines them, so can the school's efforts
be undermined if they do not receive support
from the family. Also, religion impacts the
attitudes of family members and school
administrators. Any new cultural ethos
against drug use must emerge from the
combined contributions of all these
institutions.

The principle of self-interest rightly understood
produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it
suggests daily small acts of self-denial. By itself it
cannot suffice to make a man virtuous; but it
disciplines a number of persons in habits of
regularity, temperance, moderation, foresight, selfcommand; and if it does not lead men straight to
virtue by the will, it gradually draws them in that
direction by their habits (Vetterii 1987, 257).

Values

To develop a cultural ethos against
drug abuse, society must not only work
through the most effective institutions, but
also work with the most effective values.
Not all values have equal power in deterring
illegal drug consumption. Any successful
"value initiative," designed to establish a
strong cultural ethos against drug abuse,
must incorporate the strongest anti-drug
values.
Useful values may be utilitarian or
moral. Also they must "fit in" with the
targeted culture. Values that play well in
white middle-class America, for example,
may seem foreign among urban, AfricanAmerican communities. Though we often
exaggerate our differences, they do exist and
we need to be sensitive. One of the
strengths of community-level initiatives is
that they can be tailored to specific subcultures, employing the most appropriate
and effective symbols, institutions, and
values. Families, churches, and schools can
tailor their efforts to their members, thereby
being more effective than a nationwide,
publicly lead campaign, which conjures up
frightening images of social engineering.

Simply, "self-interest rightly understood"
means a healthy ambition. Self-interested
individuals abstain from self-defeating
activities, such as drug abuse.
While
judging self-interest capable of removing
"large segments of a new underclass
generation from a drug abuse culture,"
LaMond Tullis concludes that
neither it nor a regime based on fear will produce
desirable long-term drug consumption results in the
absence of value change-the general development of
generations of people who desire to sustain their lives
without abusing drugs (Tullis 1991, 223).

"Self-interest rightly understood" alone
cannot succeed as a final solution to the
demand problem. It must be accompanied
by other values.
Personal Responsibility

Capable of distinguishing right from
wrong, individuals are responsible for their
behavior.
Regardless of their
circumstances, individuals must accept
ultimate accountability for their actions.
Parents, clergy, teachers, community and
government authorities must hold individuals
accountable for their behavior, lest the ethic

"Self-Interest Rightly Understood"

Among secular values, few
discourage drug abuse as powerfully as
Alexis de Tocqueville's concept of "self-21-
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of responsibility turns hollow. Comments
William Bennett, "What must link all our
efforts, from supply to demand, at all levels,
is an ethic of personal responsibility. Those
who transgress must account for their
transgression. Those who spurn or resist
transgression must be supported and
praised" (Bennett 1989, 7). In holding
individuals accountable, he continues,

techniques with a spiritual emphasis. Said
James Van Cooper, a member of the
program's advisory board and employee of
the Fairfax County Department of Mental
Health:
We tend to look at things from a clinical or treatment
perspective, and we don't deal with the spiritual
aspects of it. That's the part that is missing. The
spiritual guidance and the enrichment are the key
things that empower the users to go and make a
difference in their lives (Kaplow 1992, VI).

We need to re-orient our process of justice where drugs
are concerned and adopt the principle that certainty of
punishment is more important than severity of
punishment. Those guilty of drug offenses must believe
that punishment is inevitable. As long as they don't,
the deterrent effect of incarceration will be neutralized
(Bennett 1989, 4-5).

Numerous testimonials of recovered
drug addicts reveal that God had played an
important role in their recovery.
To
understand religion's role in keeping people
off drugs and helping them recover, we
must look at the religious values or tenets
that operate.
In America, 91 percent associate
themselves with the Christian-Judeo-Islamic
ethic, Christianity being 88 percent. These
religions share many fundamental beliefs,
including traditional prohibitions against
substance abuse. Considering the central
position of the church in American society,
the church can have a powerful impact on
the drug problem.
Among religious values, the very
belief that God exists and loves His children
can have a powerful impact against drug
use. Studies have associated drug use with
low self-esteem (Tonry 1990, 466). A
strong belief that God loves you and is
pleased with you regardless of socioeconomic standing is a forceful boost to selfimage. Paul writes in Romans 8:35,38-39:

Along this vein, not only should the
criminal justice system do a better job at
holding individuals accountable, but parents
too must hold their children responsible,
clergy should hold their parishioners
responsible, teachers and administrators
should hold their students responsible.
Especially for the young, the "certainty, not
severity" doctrine clearly labels drug use as
socially intolerable. For casual users, this
brings home the potential costs of their
behavior; for addicts, this may encourage
them to finally accept their individual
responsibility and enter treatment (Bennett
1989, 7). The internalization of personal
responsibility will contribute to a stronger
cultural ethos against drug use.
Religious Values

Religion can give people the best
reasons to avoid drug abuse. In fact,
research shows that highly religious people
are less likely to engage in drug use and that
religious support increases the likelihood of
success for individuals engaged in treatment.
In Arlington, Virginia, the Lomax AME
Zion Church is working to establish a
program that combines standard treatment

Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? shall
tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or
nakedness, or peril, or sword? ... For I am persuaded,
that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor
principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things
to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature,
shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which
is in Christ Jesus our Lord.
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For Christians, evidence of this love is
found in John 3: 16: "For God so loved the
world, that he gave his only begotten Son."
Belief that God loves us individually and
unconditionally fortifies an individual's selfworth. Found in Judaism, Christianity and
Islam, concepts of "chosenness" can also
add upon this love and increase self-worth.
Hope and faith are other powerful
tenets in religion.
Given God's love,
Christians, Jews, and Moslems share
Matthew's contention that "with God all
things are possible" (Matthew 19:26). The
Lord asked Abraham, "Is any thing too hard
for the Lord?" (Genesis 18: 14). Low selfconfidence is associated with substance
abuse (Tonry 1990, 466).
Low selfconfidence also discourages people
attempting to break the addiction. Hope and
faith in God's power enables addicts to
overcome an addiction which might seem
impossible to overcome alone. In addition,
those who may be led to use drugs in
despair of their situation might resist by
having hope and faith in God's power to
help the individual overcome his trials in
life. The civil rights movement drew upon
the faith and hope of its members in God to
deliver. In the same spirit, the Reverend
Jesse Jackson recognizes the need for hope
in poor communities, making famous the
call, "Up with hope! Down with dope!"
These values are most powerful in their
effect on drug use when placed in a
religious context.
Another valuable religious tenet
found in America is the belief in life-afterdeath and that all individuals must face a
[mal judgement by a just God. This belief
makes individuals accountable not only to
the law for public behavior, but also to God
for private behavior. This tends to have a
moderating effect on personal behavior,
including "victimless" crimes.

Last, all three major American
religions and many more share a common
charge to followers to love their fellowmen.
Said Jesus, "A new commandment I give
unto you, That ye love one another; as I
have loved you." (John 13:34). In Leviticus
19: 18, the Lord commanded Israel, "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Love
implies not only concern, but also
commitment and sacrifice for another. This
fundamental tenet of religion will not only
strengthen family bonds, but also require
tempted individuals to think twice and
contemplate the impact their drug use will
have on others.
In searching for a cultural ethos
against drug use, secular and religious
values can have a positive impact. The
most persuasive arguments not to use drugs
are often religiously based. But those most
vulnerable to be drawn into drugs may not
be reached easily by religious arguments.
No cultural ethos against drug use can
appear overnight; it may take generations as
these values take greater root in society.
But as a society gradually internalizes these
values, it becomes healthier and more
capable to deal with the hardest to reach.
Conclusion
After a decade of fighting the "war
on drugs," the nation's situation seems
worse. Americans generally sense that their
efforts have failed to reduce drug
consumption and its related externalities.
As violent crime increases and general
health decreases, the quality of life in
American society, particularly in urban
America, suffers.
American policy-makers are at a loss
for a solution. A decade-long strategy
emphasizing supply-side reductions has
failed; demand approaches have thus far
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Three hundred and sixty-two blacks under the age of
21 have been killed by other blacks in New York
City this year. More than 300 in New Orleans.
Around the country there is this rage of violence, not
born of poverty and neglect as much as driven by
drugs and guns and perverse values (Sullivan 1993,
AI4).

produced only marginal results. The longterm solution to America's drug problem
lies out of the reach of government policymakers.
While government initiatives
against both supply and demand may be
helpful in the ultimate mix, a lasting
solution will only come from a broad-based
cultural ethos against drug use.
Family, church, and school are the
primary institutions that transmit the
essential pro-social, moral values that unite
society in order and peace. They highlight
the common values within society that
permit individuals to live peacefully and
positively with one another. When weak: or
unhealthy, these institutions are less capable
of transmitting the most important societal
values, including those values that most
effectively discourage drug use.
Jesse Jackson had it right speaking to
a concerned group recently:

America's answer to the drug
problem should not focus on the Bolivian
coca farmer, but on our own soul as a
nation. As the scripture says, "first cast out
the beam out of thine own eye; and then
shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote
out of thy brother's eye" (Matthew 7:5). By
strengthening the institutions of moral
socialization and employing the most
effective anti-drug values, a cultural ethos
against drug use can succeed to significantly
reduce drug consumption in America.
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Years of Decision: An Explanation of the 1948 and 1949
Yugoslavian Conflicts
Stephanie McWhorter
Introduction

made by the Yugoslavian government. The
first decision came in 1948, the second in
1949. To Western powers both decisions
appeared to have been made to reach the
same end, i.e. to fmd favor with the
obviously stronger and more correct camp,
the West. To the Soviets, both decisions
seemingly attempted to separate, then
distance the two countries. In the process
Yugoslavia turned her back to the
Communist brotherhood and became a
hapless pawn for imperialist kings.
Both are powerful arguments, but
with a closer examination of the actual
situation, primary players, and the world
political structure of the time, a different
argument can be made.
This will be
discussed in greater detail later , but first the
fascinating story behind these two
momentous decisions must be told.

With the conclusion of World War
II, the cementing of a strong bi-polar sphere
of influence system appeared imminent.
The two dominant powers, the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, gathered their allies together,
bolstering their military, economic and
political strength. To the casual, or even
informed Western observer, the Yugoslavian
government's commitment to the Soviet
agenda seemed firm and unwavering. As
late as April 12, 1948, Yugoslavian leader
Marshal Josip Broz Tito relayed his
commitment to Stalin, detailing his party's
achievements for the communist cause and
past loyalties (Banac 1988, 117). Yet within
three months, ties between the two countries
would be strained and the Western world
shocked by an apparently irreconcilable
schism between the two strong Communist
countries.
What led to the shocking severance
of ties and Yugoslavia's subsequent
conciliatory actions toward Western powers?
On the surface it might appear that the
Yugoslavian government acted irrationally
and against all norms. Both the USSR and
Yugoslavia were Communist countries fully
dedicated to the ideals of Marx and Lenin.
Both iterated an intense hatred for the
capitalist, imperialist West. Both advocated
a world-wide Communist ideology and
brotherhood. Yet the two countries sharply
separated in 1948; one controlled the
Communist sphere of influence, the other
found acceptance in the Western camp.
This abrupt, seemingly illogical split
can be explained by examining two decisions

Historical Analysis
The Decision in 1948
On April 12, 1948 the Komunisticka
partija Jugoslavije Central Committee (the
Communist party of Yugoslavia, KPJ)
convened at the Old Palace in Belgrade's
Dedinje section (Wilson 1979, 55). The
primary purpose of the meeting was to
formulate a response to Stalin's First Letter,
a harsh correspondence containing
accusations, threats, and demands
concerning Yugoslavian loyalty, actions, and
state goals. Tito's response posited a calm,
collected reply,
emphasizing shared
ideology, equality and nationality. During
the course of meeting's discussion, Edvard
Kardelj, the second man in the Politburo,
-27-
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determined that "our party contributed quite
a few new elements to the treasury of
Marx[ism]-Len[inism].
[We made a]
contribution to the struggle against
imp[erialism] in the international arena. We
supported the USSR in a creative way"
(Banac 1988, 118).
The participants
confirmed the government's commitment to
the Communist agenda, but announced that
other considerations had to take priority. As
Tito firmly stated, "No matter how much
some of us love the land of socialism, the
USSR, he can, in no case, love his own
country less, which also is building
socialism" (Banac 1988, 118).
Stalin immediately issued his Second
Letter, accusing the Yugoslavs, and Tito
specifically, of equating the USSR with the
imperialist great powers. He ridiculed the
detailed achievements of the Yugoslavian
government and proclaimed that no
Communist government could come to
power, or presume to stay in power, without
Soviet military aid (Banac 1988, 123). He
concluded by suggesting that the Yugoslavs
present their case to the Communist
Information Bureau, the Cominform,
allowing all brother Communist states to
hear both sides of the issue (Wilson 1979,
57).
Tito and Kardelj officially responded
to Stalin's Second Letter, rejecting the
possibility of any Cominform arbitration.
They charged the USSR with assuring the
conflict's outcome by lobbying other
governments. They then reaffirmed their
loyalty to socialism, the Soviet Union and
Marxism-Leninism (Banac 1988, 124).
After receiving the third letter, Stalin
and other leaders continued their attempt to
persuade the Yugoslavs to attend the
Cominform meeting. These efforts failed.
When the official invitation arrived on June
10, 1948, Tito informed Cominform
representatives that no Yugoslavian
delegation would be present (Banac 1988,

125).
By choosing to not participate in this
forum, Tito permitted several things to
happen. First, by not allowing any type of
official representation, the other Communist
leaders were able to condemn all his actions,
unilaterally. Their rationale assumed that
since Tito chose not to defend his country's
actions, he was obviously guilty of all Soviet
charges, and was therefore a traitor to the
Communist party.
Second, his refusal to participate in
an official Communist forum cast
considerable doubts about his sincerity in the
Communist cause. The Communist camp
quickly doubted his faithfulness and loyalty
while the Western powers eagerly began
courting Yugoslavia as a prospective ally.
This obvious breach in the balance of power
further destabilized the international system
temporarily while Yugoslavia attempted to
resituate itself in the world's structure.
Third, Yugoslavia's future course of
action appeared precarious. By snubbing,
insulting, and even openly opposing the
Soviet Union, any attempts at future
reconciliation would be extremely difficult,
and conceivably achieved only through many
conciliatory gestures, economic sacrifices,
and political sacrifices. After beginning
negotiations for a possible alignment with
the West, Yugoslavia set itself in a
dangerous position. The Soviet Union was
a formidable foe, even for the United States.
What chances could a small, militarily
insignificant country have against a nuclearendowed superpower?
During the Cominform,
representatives from the other Communist
governments formulated the Cominform
Resolution. On June 28, 1948 the Western
world received a tremendous shock when
made aware of the conflict between two
Communist governments. The accusations
listed in the Resolution included antiSovietism, practical and ideological errors,
-28-
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party departures from Leninist theory, a lack
of intra-party democracy, and repeated
refusals to accept criticism (Banac 1988,
125). The most serious charge, made in
point eight, held that KPJ leaders "have
placed themselves in opposition to the
Communist parties within the Information
Bureau, have taken the road of seceding
from the united socialist from against
imperialism, betraying the cause of
international solidarity of the working
people, and have taken a nationalist
position" (Banac 1988, 125).
The Resolution issued a blanket
condemnation, stating "The Information
Bureau considers that, in view of all this,
the KPJ CC has excluded itself and the KPJ
from the family of fraternal Communist
parties, the united Communist front, and
consequently is outside the ranks of the
InformationBureau" (Banac 1988,125-126).
Needless to say, the international
system changed dramatically, jolted from a
relatively stable multipolar system into
further chaos. Suddenly there was a small,
but significant threat to one superpower's
preeminence, which stunned both Western
and Communist leaders.

Governor by the Security Council of the
U.N. The Soviets had hoped to eventually
render this plan unworkable, but even
through 1949, an Anglo-American military
occupation force continued to control the
area under the FTT, along with increasing
Italian participation (Wilson 1979, 85).
On 20 March 1949, to help the
Italian Christian Democrat party in a crucial
election, the US, British and French
governments addressed a declaration to the
Soviet and Yugoslav governments proposing
that the whole FTT be given back to Italy
(Wilson 1979, 85).
Tito received the
request; he found himself forced to follow
either Soviet or Western demands.
This Tripartite Declaration pushed
the Yugoslav leaders into a precarious
position. Their strained diplomatic relations
with the USSR forced them to realize that
should they agree to the Declaration, their
agreement might become a serious policy
commitment to the West. Tito realized that
by deciding to prioritize national interests
above the Communist system of states, he
would completely alienate the Soviet Union.
Even with this realization, he decided that
the best course of action would be to
gradually change camps, easing out of the
Communist structure into the Western camp,
while optimizing Yugoslavia's current and
potential position for Western aid.
The actual implementation of all
points in the Declaration constituted a long,
tedious series of diplomatic, economic and
political maneuvers.
The exchange
concluded in October 1954 with the Italians
receiving full control of the entire territory;
Tito privately expressed great satisfaction
with the outcome. The whole arrangement
had been reached without Soviet
participation or objection, Tito had
demonstrated he was ready to stand up to
his Western protectors for Yugoslavian
national interests, and he had safeguarded
Yugoslavia against any further effective

The Decision in 1949
After almost one year of tense
relations, the Yugoslavian government
indicated its future direction with its action
in a small area belonging to Italy. This
decision further defined Tito's split with
Stalin, and caused the Western powers to
believe that soon Yugoslavia would be
pursuing their agenda.
At the Paris Peace negotiations of
1946, the Yugoslavs had demanded the port
and hinterland of Trieste, a demand
resulting primarily from Soviet pressures.
Under that Paris Peace Treaty in 1946, a
Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) was
constituted, to be administered by a
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claim by the Italians (Wilson 1979, 90-91).
This historical recitation provides
interesting details, but does not explain any
of the reasons for the two implemented
decisions. To fully understand the reasons
for the two nations' split, other factors must
be considered. Through detailed analyses of
the leadership and governmental structure,
as perceived by the international community,
domestic opposition, and systemic
influences, the two decisions are better
understood on three other levels.
Ultimately, however, an integrative attempt
to combine the most important influences
from all three areas will explain the
decisions from one integrated level.

of the actors and the arena must be
intertwined.
To effectively analyze the
situation, Tito and the governmental
framework will be accorded primary
attention, with minor emphasis on Kardelj
and Djilas. The latter two actors' roles
should not be considered subordinate to
Tito's; each actor contributed greatly to the
process.
Josip Broz-Tito
Thus the CPY was able, immediately
after the liberation, to carry out the second
highly important and difficult task: to
complete the organization of new Yugoslavia
as a state, but as a state of a new type-a
true people's democracy, founded upon
federal principles, with full equality for all
the peoples of Yugoslavia. (Tito 1983, 121)
So proclaimed Tito in June of 1948. But
who was this curiously charismatic leader?
Who was the great nationalistic statesman
who challenged Stalin, and lived to see the
rise and fall of both Stalin and his doctrine?
Josip Broz-Tito, the son of CroatianSlovenian peasants, was born in 1892. He
spent his first fifteen years in Kumrovec, an
inconsequential Croatian village in the
Austro-Hungarian empire. For the next
three years he worked as a locksmith's
apprentice until becoming a full-time
Communist organizer. Tito spent the next
six years wandering throughout the Empire,
until 1913 when the Austrian Army
demanded he fulfill his two year military
commitment. During World War I, he
gained the rank of a non-commissioned
officer and fought with honor until he was
captured by the Russians in 1916. He spent
the next year in a Russian hospital, 500
miles east of Moscow. While in Russia, he
became well versed in the Communist
movement and its avowed hatred for all
capitalistic, imperialistic powers.l After
returning to Veliko Trojstvo, a Croatian

Leadership and Governmental Structure

When examining Yugoslavia's break
with the Soviet Union and her subsequent
conciliatory actions towards the West,
including the voluntary relinquishment of
Trieste, the prominence of two
fundamentally important national actors
arises: the players and their forum, the
Yugoslavian governmental structure. The
international system viewed these two actors
as the dominant policy makers, and
discounted the possibility of internal
conflicts.
Thus, from the international
perspective, only the leadership and
governmental structure influenced national
foreign policy.
The primary national actors came
from two opposing, yet cooperating,
ideological groups, namely the "theoretical"
group, led by Edvard Kardelj, Milovan
Djilas, Boris Kidric, and Vladimir Bakaric,
and the "pragmatic" group, led by Tito and
Alexander-Leka Rankovic (Djilas 1980, 3334). Tito occupied the dominant role, but
Kardelj and Djilas also played significant
roles in the decision-making process.
To better understand the processes of
1948 and 1949, the explanation and analysis
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village, he became heavily involved with
local Communist politics.
He moved
through the ranks, from the local, through
the regional, and finally into the national
level. Tito won membership in the Central
Committee of the CPY in 1934. After a
1937 party purge (ordered by Stalin), he
became secretary general (Djilas 1980, 27).
Throughout the war he continued to lead the
Communist party, playing a dominant role
in the Partisan military resistance group
(Djilas 1991, 92). In November 1943, Tito
convened the second meeting of the
Antifasisticko vece narodnog oslobodjenja
Jugoslavije - AVNOJ (Antifascist Council
for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia),
a committee of communist and
noncommunist Partisan representatives
which acted as a Partisan political umbrella
organization. This session built the basis for
the postwar government of Yugoslavia,
mandating four decisions:
1.

The country would be reconstituted
on a federal basis.

2.

A national committee to act as a
temporary government was elected.

3.

Tito was name marshal and prime
minister of Yugoslavia.

4.

A declaration forbidding King Petar,
the pre-war head of state, to return
to the country until a popular
referendum had been held on the
status of the monarchy was issued.
(Wilson 1979, 29)

been unable to inform Stalin of the session
before the fact), he had no choice but to
support his Western allies, which translated
into public support for Tito's power.
The communist party, headed by
Tito, emerged from the war as the only
viable Yugoslav leadership. A detail which
seemed inconsequential at the time, but
would later manifest tremendous
ramifications, was the lack of major Soviet
support and backing during the Partisans'
victory over Nazi Germany (Carter 1990,
25).2
On March 7, 1945 a single
provisional Yugoslav government
commenced with Tito as prime minister and
war minister. On November 29, 1945 a
newly elected constituent assembly dissolved
the monarchy and established the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 3 Two
months later a Soviet-style constitution
which provided for a federation of six
republics under a strong central government
was adopted (Rusinow 1979, 16-17).
The constitution established a
"rubber-stamp" Federal Assembly and a
presidential council to administer the federal
government. The economy was officially
centralized, but in actuality, the free market
system incorporated governmental controls.
Tito headed the party, government and
armed forces.
His party functionaries
oversaw the industries and supervised
republic and local officials (Rusinow 1977,
16-17).
As a result of the new
governmental framework,
Tito held
uncontested control over the government,
the Communist party, and the allegiance of
the Yugoslav people.
The Yugoslav government remained
essentially the same from 1948 to 1954.
The major players remained constant,
although a much more concrete ideological
split between the theoretical and pragmatic
group increased as the years progressed.
The actors functioned within the constraints
of the governmental framework. During the

The committee received full Western
support for all four decisions primarily
because the Western Allies believed the
Partisans were the only Yugoslav resistance
group opposing the Germans (Carter 1990,
23). Although Stalin was enraged by the
committee's actions (Tito had conveniently
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He was not a profound military strategist,
but his practical experiences gave him
greater insight into the overall game of war.
He accepted the horrors of war, the realities
of army life, both as an officer and a
"grunt," and the importance of the military
organization. Because he knew the army
from a common soldier's view, he
recognized the importance of an integrated
officer corp. During the Fourth Offensive
of 1943, he personally carried out the
regrouping of troops that secured the rescue
of the injured and a German defeat at Vilica
Guvno (Djilas 1980, 12-13 and 24). His
actions commanded the respect of his men.
He never passively oversaw any conflict, but
rather he actively pursued means to achieve
his desired end. His many experiences
developed a refined institutional response to
crises which would serve him well, time and
time again.
Although his experiences taught him
poise, self-containment, and a controlled
leadership style, he often became fretful,
easily agitated and would suddenly display
expressions of intimacy and warmth towards
his closest and most trusted comrades,
especially during extremely stressful
A bit of
conflicts (Djilas 1980, 31).
personal history and informal psychoanalysis
can help explain Tito's curious character
dichotomy.
During Tito' s time as a laborer, he
often operated machines. While working as
a mechanic, he sliced off the tip of his left
hand's index finger (Djilas 1980, 8). This
lifelong mutilation served as a constant
physical reminder of his humble origins and
caused him to retain a strong mental imprint
of his weaknesses. He aligned himself with
the laboring class in much of his rhetoric,
yet his latter lifestyle, which he constantly
apologized for, was modeled after the
flamboyant Latin American dictators (Djilas
1985, 61-62).6
This inherent conflict
between the shame he felt for his origins,

early months of 1948, the actors worked
within very strict limits, subordinating their
actions to the parameters of each specific
role. However, during the critical months
of the 1948 decision-making process and
then subsequent processes (including the
process involving Trieste), each actor
redefined his role, expanding his power
base, and created new parameters for future
decision making. 4
As a leader, Tito was a curious
enigma. He came from a decidedly humble
background to become one of the most
respected statesmen of the twentieth century.
Yet he was not always the poised, selfcontrolled politician who calmly opposed
Stalin. Often times he acted rashly, causing
near disaster and chaos. 5 His actions
followed no apparent consistency. Why did
this man behave so inexplicably?
Tito succeeded in grasping and
retaining political control because he was a
gifted political performer. He lacked the
education of an academic or military
strategist. His knowledge was superficial,
He
even his knowledge of Marxism.
studied the major works of Marx, Engels,
Lenin, and Stalin, but was by no accounts a
masterful theorist himself. His ability to
quickly and somewhat accurately learn new
languages aided him enormously, as he was
able to directly communicate with the
Russian, German, American, English, and
French governments. He was also able to
communicate with the various ethnic groups
of Yugoslav directly, in their own language,
although he often made serious grammatical
mistakes (Djilas 1980, 10). However, each
different ethnic group undoubtedly
recognized his tremendous desire for
acceptance and equality, manifested through
his willingness to communicate in their
language.
Tito's experiences in World War I
served as his basis for future military
leadership during the resistance movement.
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his pro-proletariate rhetoric, his lavish
lifestyle, and obvious embarrassment for his
material wealth, played heavily into Tito's
psyche, especially during intensely stressful
situations.
Even with the brief account of Tito
as a man, one cannot fully comprehend his
power unless his position within the
governmental framework is examined. As
the Partisan leader, Tito demanded near
dictatorship control (Beloff 1985, 61-62).
Since the war time setting accorded him
such control, his influence over the AVNOJ
can be accepted as significant. The AVNOJ
set the basis for the post-war government,
and a natural manifestation of Tito's war
power was his control over the post-war
government.
A transitional period between war
and peace always allows greater latitude for
a country's dominant leadership.
The
Communist party, the only viable contenders
for power, granted Tito almost unlimited
latitude for his policies and politics. Kardelj
and Djilas offered ideological opposition,
which eventually culminated in a public split
between Tito and Djilas, but did not offer
public dissent during the early post-war
years (Lustig 1989, 101). Tito was thus
able to easily move into the primary
decision-making role of a legitimate
government, with both Soviet and the
Western Allies' approval. With Stalin's
seemingly staunch support, and the Allies'
temporary approval, Tito moved quickly to
cement his dominance and build a strong
power basis.
In 1947 the establishment of the
Cominform (Communist Information
Bureau) in Belgrade further strengthened the
image that Yugoslavia was the strongest
Soviet ally in Eastern Europe. This image
was far from the truth since Stalin's primary
motivation behind the creation was to
increase the ability to manipulate the
political, military, and economic sectors of

Eastern Europe to benefit the Soviet Union
(Banac 1988, 26-7). Stalin's disapproval for
greater Yugoslav independence created
hidden resentment between the two
countries, causing fledgling tensions which
erupted in 1948. When the conflict came to
the fore, Tito was in such a preeminent
position that he was able to challenge Stalin
directly and commandingly.
Domestic Influences

Yugoslavia was officially a closed
Communist state governed by the Socialist
As the party and
Federal Republic.
government commander, Tito's power and
influence were not questioned. Even to this
day, few contest Tito's power derived from
his positions. But I question whether Tito
truly held absolute power over his country's
actions. His two right-hand men, Kardelj
and Djilas, played important roles
throughout the Communist party's history.
They were present at the party's inception,
they actively resisted the Nazis, and they
joined together to fight Stalin. In fact, both
were present when all important decisions
were made, and played important roles
during the decision making processes.
Kardelj was a very intelligent, well-educated
man. Djilas proved to be an eloquent author
of prose, poetry and political speeches.
Kardelj powered the Politburo as the secondin-command. Djilas acted as Tito's official
speech writer for many years. I believe that
these two men worked quietly behind the
scenes to control all governmental decisions,
using Tito as a front so that the international
system would credit Tito and his
government with international legitimacy.
This legitimacy translated into national
power which Djilas and Kardelj then used to
further their own specific agendas. Tito
merely played the part of a charismatic
statesman to woo the West and repudiate the
East.
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Milovan Djilas

As an educated ideologue and
theorist, Djilas better understood the
ramifications of a political separation with
Stalin. Tito viewed the proposed split as
completely political in nature, having only
ramifications for Yugoslavic economic,
military, and agriculture systems. Djilas
realized that the separation signified an
ideological split that would result in a
Western versus Eastern Communist ideology
battle. Nevertheless, Djilas was willing to
assume this new battle because he refused to
accept Stalin's response to Yugoslavic
national problems (Lustig 1989, 99-101).
As Tito's official speech writer,
Djilas held tremendous power. So long as
the overall content of a particular speech
was acceptable, details were not that
important to a very busy, non-ideologically
driven man.
Whereas for Dj ilas , an
intellectual and political theorist, ideological
details were everything (Sulzberger 1989,
80-81).
The Party Central Committee
ultimately expelled Djilas from both the
party and the government in 1958 because
he advocated a dissolution of the party
(Carter 1990, 44). Until that point, his
ideology crept into Tito's official statements.
While Stalin was pursuing policies according
to strict Communist policies, Tito began
speaking about a new brand of Communism.
This new movement was more of a
socialistic and democratic governmental
attempt to achieve Communism. Djilas
personally promoted three issues:

Milovan Djilas was born in 1911 into
a Montenegrin clan. Djilas explained his
class origins as growing up in "an
environment of peasant civil servants, more
peasant than anything else, like so many
Montenegrin intellectuals of my generation"
(Lustig 1989, 75). His father's generation
encountered a difficult question, whether
Montenegro would unite with Greater Serbia
or remain independent, whereas Djilas'
generation had to decide whether to side
with the Nazis, the Fascists, the
Communists, or the West (Lustig 1989, 76).
At the age of seven, Djilas decided he was
a Communist. 7
While attending the University in
Belgrade, he became actively involved in the
student Communist movement. He was
arrested and imprisoned after leading a
protest over student elections (Lustig 1989,
87). His activities attracted the attention of
Party leaders, including Tito, and after his
imprisonment, he was contacted and
persuaded to join the great Yugoslavic
brotherhood. During the war, he continued
working within the party, remaining a
staunch supporter of Stalinist principles and
ideologies. However, after the completion
of the war, his way of thinking changed.
Djilas envisioned a different type of world
Communist order than did Stalin.
He
wanted to pursue a more democratic,
socialistic ideology rather than accept
Stalin's doctrines (Clissold 1983, 209).
This was especially true once Stalin began
concentrating completely on growth and
development within the USSR.
Djilas
realized that should Yugoslavia follow
Stalin's plan, eventually the country would
be little more than a European colony for
mother Russia (Pavlowitch 1971, 194).
This idea was so unacceptable to Djilas that
he convinced Tito to reject Stalin's policies
and accept Western aid offers.

1. Revolution in Yugoslavia had to be
defended by more democracy.

2. Stalinist principles and policies were
incorrect.
3.
Dogmatism and opportunism were
dangerous. (Lustig 1989, 101)
The government officially banned him for
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promoting these three issues, but oddly
enough, they bear a striking resemblance to
Tito's policies and official statements made
during 1948. 8

political ideologies, it is easy to speculate
that he, as did Djilas, better understood the
ideological significance of the government's
actions (Clissold 1983, 32). After the
government decided to terminate relations
with the USSR, Kardelj fashioned
international and domestic policies. With
this in mind, it must be accepted that
Kardelj had to begin preliminary work with
the Western powers to secure support and
aid for his country. These negotiations must
have begun several months prior to the
actual separation. Once Kardelj invested so
much time and interest into a possible future
alliance with the West, he probably felt
extremely committed to secure a
Yugoslavian and Western alliance. Since he
held great influence over Tit09 , he
undoubtedly presented several national
options, focusing on and strongly
emphasizing the benefits of an alliance with
the West.
Djilas also favored this option
because of the national benefits he believed
would come with the alliance. It is not
unreasonable to believe that the two men
coordinated their efforts to persuade Tito to
accept the suggested alliance. Perhaps part
of their persuasion involved presenting
biased information, giving the West a new
validity, conceiving a new brand of ideology
which appealed to Tito, or even making
decisions within their jurisdiction which
forced Tito into a position where he could
not reconcile his government with the
USSR. 10
At this point in time, only
speculative answers can be given, but it
must be accepted that the two men greatly
influenced the nation's behavior.
As the two men were far more
involved with ordinary, day-to-day national
problems, they understood the importance of
Western aid much more than did Tito.
Kardelj helped to quickly implement land
collectivization programs in 1947, so he
must have been very concerned with the

Edvard Kardelj
Edvard Kardelj remained a staunch
supporter of Tito until his death. Because
he worked primarily behind the scenes
supporting Tito, very little is actually
documented about his influence and power.
The information known and accepted as fact
includes the following:
1. Kardelj wielded great power within the
party and the government since he remained
the highest ranking official, second only to
Tito, for several decades (Clissold 1983,
312-313).
2. Kardelj came from a humble background
and relative obscurity as a school teacher to
great political prominence during the war.
He understood well the plight of the
common man and sympathized strongly with
the laborers and other blue-collar workers
(Rusinow 1977, 8).
3. Kardelj was Tito' s intellectual superior,
he was well versed in the Communist
doctrine, and he supported the party
emphatically throughout his life (Clissold
1983, 32-33).
4.
Kardelj was Djilas' equal, both
intellectually, economically, and socially,
and the two shared a close working relatio
nship during their time together in the Party
(Djilas 1985, 162, 170).
As the second highest ranking official
in the Party, Kardelj undoubtedly advised
and guided Tito while serving in a position
similar to that of a National Security
Advisor. Since Kardelj was better versed in
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agriculture system. This system stood to
receive invaluable technology and aid once
an alliance with the West commenced.
Djilas concerned himself with the political
ideology of the country more than anything
else, and this too would gain from a
Western alliance. Since the West pursued
policies of democracy and socialism 11, the
leaders would more willingly accept Djilas's
ideology, thus crediting him greater national
legitimacy and power through acceptance of
Yugoslavic international policies.

Systemic Influences

During 1948, the international system
was a fluid, multi-polar system, although the
United States and the USSR had begun
moving into their superpower, polarized
positions. Since there were still many
countries sharing tremendous power and
influence, a smaller, dependent and
relatively powerless country would not be
secure in that type of system.
This
insecurity forced the Yugoslavian
government into a precarious position once
the events of 1948 snowballed.
As a smaller, relatively unimportant
country with a history of domination (eg.
Austro-Hungarian empire), the many
Yugoslavic ethnic groups were not unified
and did not share particularly strong ties
with other countries, with the notable
exception of the pan-Slavic sentiments
shared with USSR slavs. 14 The country
was not geo-strategically important since it
shared the Adriatic Sea with Italy. During
World War II, the Allies demonstrated their
preference when the Fascists in Italy took
precedence over German-occupied
Yugoslavia. Naturally, the West would use
Italian ports rather than Yugoslavic ports.
The rest of the country shared borders with
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria.
By 1948, the first four countries were firmly
allied with Stalin's Communist party while
Austria, an Allied-controlled country,
maintained little contact with Yugoslavia
(Beloff 1985, 148).
Before World War II, most of the
country was neither modernized nor
industrialized. After the war, the few
industrialized sectors were completely
destroyed. The agriculture system could not
support all of the country, so the
government relied heavily on economic and
agriculture aid. Yugoslavia had a

Other Domestic Forces
Although the major individual
governmental actors wielded the greatest
amount and influence, other domestic forces
helped shape the international policies. It is
well documented that a country suffering
economic hardships will reject moderate
politics in favor of wild solutions offered by
extreme political groups (Carter 1990,
21).12 The government was pressured by
anyone involved, directly or indirectly, with
the economic system. Additionally, the
ethnic disunity throughout the country forced
the government to actively pursue unifying
policies so the country would not
disintegrate. 13 The government understood
that the economy must stabilize so the entire
country would accept a specific ideology.
When Tito's party first embraced
Communism, they believed the ideology
would unify the country into an international
brotherhood, transcending all ethnic
conflicts (Djilas 1985, 32). But realities set
in after the war, and the government had to
control inflation, unemployment and food
shortages. Very quickly, the advantages of
Western aid and the mandated free market
system became attractive. Consequently,
the government replaced ideology with
economics to achieve national unification.
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other national governments had to be
considered. To facilitate my analysis, I
classified these relationships into three
categories. The following is a list of the
important countries in their respective
categories.

substantial natural resource base, but it was
not being maximized (Wilson 1979, 44-45).
National interests forced the
government to find answers within the
international system.
The Yugoslavian
government had to secure close ties with
powers that could support the country with
substantial amounts of aid. Also, once
Stalin repudiated Yugoslavia's importance to
the Communist order, the government was
forced to reassess its standing among its
Communist allies.
Yugoslavia's actions during 1948-49
can be partly explained by the systemic
influences on the nation. Maurice A. East,
a systemic expert, theorized that nations'
actions directly result from systemic
pressures exerted through the international
community (East, 143). His theories help
explain the inconceivable: why Stalin's
disciples would abandon the Communistic
world order and side with the "evil,"
capitalistic West.

1. Direct: USSR, Eastern European
Communist Governments
2. Indirect: US, England, Italy, France
3. Off-shoot: Western European
Countries, Mediterranean countries.
Direct Relationships
During the months immediately
preceding the split, Tito and his high
ranking officials were directly involved in
all intra-Comintern negotiations (Djilas
This relationship
1985, 199-204).
dominated the government's foreign policy
agenda since once they defined this
relationship, their domestic agenda would be
prioritized. That is, once they determined
that Yugoslavia would not participate in
Stalin's world Communist movement, the
government abandoned its former strict
Stalinist policies to pursue a moderate,
Yugoslavian brand of Communism. 16 The
direct relationship with other Eastern
European counties, including Hungary and
Romania, also changed.
Instead of
maintaining these countries as partners for
economic ventures and political unity ,
Yugoslavia turned its attention to Western
European Communist movements, especially
in Greece (pavlowitch 1971, 205).

Complexity
The complexity of the system
directly affects a nation's actions. Two
defining complexity characteristics to
consider are:
1. The number and type of actors.
2. The number and type of issues.
In 1948, during the months leading
to Tito's split with Stalin, the huge number
of players flooded the international system.
Since the system was still a fluid multipolar system, many more actors held
overinflated amounts of power relative to
their capabilities. 15 Since there were so
many international actors, the Yugoslavian
government had to be much more
concerned with its every action and the
subsequent consequences. Also, the type
of relationship between it and the various

Indirect Relationships
The Yugoslavian government
communicated with the West during the
critical months, but this relationship was not
a primary concern to Tito until right before
-37-

Pi Sigma Alpha Review - 1994

the split. Nevertheless, these relationships
were considered important because of
possible ramifications for future alliances
and aid.
The West primarily encouraged
Tito's split by overlooking certain
governmental practices it felt were
unacceptable. Western aid was promised
and even began arriving en masse prior to
the split (Carter 1990, 27). The Allies
hoped that if they offered aid and support to
Tito, Yugoslavia would defect from Stalin's
By indirectly influencing
stronghold.
Yugoslavia through promises of future aid
and alliances, the West gave Tito the
confidence he needed to terminate relations
with Stalin.

government.
Many other topics were
discussed and negotiated, but ultimately
every issue traced its resolution back to that
one conflict. In this sense, the international
system was less complex, since ideology
replaced such things as nationalism,
ethnicity, and neo-colonialism in
importance. During 1948, several topics
discussed, including national rebuilding
plans, economic plans and future national
security, fell into this quandary. Two of
these issues had major ramifications on
Yugoslavia's course of action. The question
of occupational forces in Trieste and the
Marshall Plan forced the government to
chose between the West or the USSR. Tito
realized that by cooperating with the West
over the Trieste question, a more favorable
aid package could be secured from the
Marshall Plan. This decision required a
rejection of the Communist order in favor of
the Western capitalists. Since Tito realized
that his decision would ultimately answer the
question of where his true allegiance lay, his
decision making-process was simplified. He
could not view each decision as a single,
independent decision with an endless
possible number of consequences. Rather,
he understood each decision to be an action
which would logically lead to the next
decision. 17 Ultimately, his decisions would
culminate in a final pledge of allegiance to
either the Western or Stalinist ideology.

Off-shoot Relationships
Yugoslavia's indirect relationship
with the major Western powers dramatically
affected its off-shoot relationships once
negotiations for Western support began.
While communicating with the major
Western powers, Yugoslavia encountered
opposition over its blatant attempts to foster
and cultivate Western communist
movements. The Allies made it clear that if
Yugoslavia wanted aid, all open challenges
to Western-styled governments must stop.
Yugoslavia obliged, toning down their
insurgent activities during the next few
months (Wilson 1979, 63). Once allied with
the West, Tito's aspirations for a Western
Communist brotherhood vanished along with
the open and strong support needed by the
insurgent movements for survival. This
effectively paralyzed the movements,
abruptly halting the Western Communist
march.

Structure of Interaction
The structure of conflict during this
critical time was strictly bi-polar. The
USSR and Yugoslavia remained stringent
centers around which the conflict revolved.
This structure simplified the system
tremendously since the other international
actors were able to quickly determine their
position within the conflict. The Eastern
European countries aligned themselves with
the USSR while the West emphatically

Number and Type of Issues
The dominant issue of the day was
the Communist versus the Western style of
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supported Yugoslavia. Since these other
players did not wander from side to side,
the national leaders were able to recognize
and name their primary enemy, without
diverting important resources to fight other
insignificant players. 18

Degree of Organization
The international system was not
highly organized since it was not yet a
strict, bi-polar type.
Rather, it was
characterized by disunity and confusion.
Each national actor was attempting to find
their place within the new system. This
confusion created a looser, less threatening
environment for change since every country
expected change. Although Yugoslavia's
split with Stalin shocked the international
system, many leaders expected dramatic
changes during the transition from the postWorld War IT era into the new world order.
It is understood that countries act in their
best national interest, and for many,
Yugoslavia's defection into the Western
camp was little more than that. 19 The
obvious gains Yugoslavia stood to reap
caused many to credit the switch to reasons
for national security as opposed to
ideological reasons.
The 1948 system
willingly accepted this rationale since it was
not very rigid. Had this same defection
occurred a mere five years later, it is
conceivable that a crackdown, similar to the
response to the 1958 Hungarian rebellion,
would have happened.

Distribution of Resources
This aspect of the international
system was very important in influencing
Yugoslavia's actions. The East did not have
an efficient, well-run resource distribution
system.
Even though the USSR had
supported Yugoslavia with economic,
military, and material aid, by 1948 the
sources dried up. Since the governments had
been receiving less from the Soviets, the
leaders had begun national programs for
self-sufficiency (Beloff 1985, 147).
A
collectivization land program began in 1947
to ease food shortages. Industrialization and
modernization continued through private and
Western foreign direct investment (Beloff
1985, 149). Basically, the leaders realized
that if they were to achieve equal standing
among world leaders, they needed new
economic partners. For this reason, the
Western capitalists became attractive allies.
Evidence of the West's efficient resource
distribution was abundant throughout
Western occupied territory. Food shortages
were easing back into relative abundance.
New technology was imported from the
United States, furthering rapid
modernization. Shattered economies were
slowly being pieced together with the
Marshall Plan. When confronted with the
option of a future working relationship with
either the West or the East, it is very easy
to understand Tito's sudden acceptance of
the capitalist "pigs."

Integrative Attempts
Of the two presented decisions, the
1948 split between Yugoslavia and the
USSR is the dominant action while the 1949
Trieste problem followed as a logical
continuation.
Since no action is truly
isolated from the events leading up to and
following it, the official separation must be
considered as the central action, with the
Trieste conflict as an off-shoot of the
original problem.
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Explanations for the conflicts have
been offered at four different levels:
historical, international, domestic and
systemic.
Each explanation provides
excellent rationale for the decision, albeit
purely one-dimensional. Since all four
explanations are inseparably intertwined, the
previously offered analysis does not
sufficiently justify the conflicts' roots.
Therefore, an integrative explanation must
be presented.

not for long term purposes.
The
government will approach the international
system with a more pragmatic agenda. That
is, the government will pursue policies that
will best serve national interests at that
specific time. The domestic system will
become more stringent since the
international system will not assure long
term security. The government will have to
compensate for that security by tightening
domestic policies and restricting behavior
that could hurt the nation. This will result
in loss of diverse players moving throughout
the government. The role will replace the
individual in importance, although the
individual will still influence the role.
Because the government will be less secure,
the top few leaders will actively work to
cement their control, thereby shutting out
weaker domestic opposition. The domestic
scene will still be relatively free for those
players already within it, but those on the
government's periphery will be effectively
shut out.
3. If the international system is
chaotic, the nation will pursue isolationist
policies to withdraw from the system. The
domestic leadership will become
authoritarian so that the country can be
stabilized internally, thereby lessening the
effects of a chaotic international system.
There will be little movement within the
government since those already within the
structure will not voluntarily relinquish
power. Control of the country will be held
by only a few political elitists. The role
will replace the individual completely
because the individual will fear expulsion
from the government, and therefore will not
try to increase their power base or the
parameters of their role.

Presented Hypotheses
Based on the presented analysis and
information, I have devised three hypotheses
which explain a mid-sized country's actions.
So long as the country is a player in the
international system, the following will
apply.
1. If the international system is
rigid, the country will form strong alliances
with other nations. The country will attempt
to find, and then maintain, a strong alliance
with one of the dominant international
system's players. Once it cements a strong
alliance, the state's government will become
less rigid since the international security
level is high. This internal relaxation will
allow more movement within the
government by different players.
The
individual will be emphasized over the role.
Since this type of internal
environment is conducive to change, roles
will be re-defined according to the abilities
and energies of the individual currently
occupying that specific role. Additionally,
a domestic multi-political party system will
develop, although factions and extremists
will not flourish. The international security
affords greater national security, so the
government will not feel threatened by the
presence of several strong political parties.
2. Should the international system
be flexible, the nation's government will
pursue many alliances and friendships, but

Practical Explanation
The three presented hypotheses
explain Yugoslavia's behavior at three
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different times.
1. After 1948, the international system was
a rigid bi-polar system. 20
a. The rigidity permitted critics and
dissenting governmental players to continue
playing an active role in the government
since the government did not fear national
insecurity. The greatest example of this is
the work of Djilas. From 1948-1953, he
continually wrote critical essays,
fictionalized fact, and opinions which
charged the Party with abandoning the true
socialist ideals. The Party did not respond
officially until 1954 when he was put on
trial. Tito and Kardelj launched an intensive
attack, arguing that Djilas' primary sin was
his call for the liquidation of the Communist
League (Lustig 1989, 108).
Djilas
emphasized throughout his writings the
necessity of immediately extending
democracy so that socialism could be
achieved. Tito and Kardelj emphatically
rejected that idea because, as they
understood the situation, the government
depended on coercion to maintain its rule
and carry out its social and political
program.
Kardelj went so far as to
announce "We are forced to retain even in
economic relations, let along in political
life, certain elements of coercion in order to
get away from the old and backward ways
as soon as possible." Tito declared that to
extend democracy to the bourgeoisie would
lead "to anarchy, to a terrible uncertainty. .
. . If we permitted this, in a year's time our
Socialist reality would not exist: it would
not exist, I tell you, without a bloody battle"
(Lustig 1989, 108).
These are harsh accusations, yet
Djilas' actions went unchecked for five
years. The reason for the government's
quick condemnation was the change within
the international system. 1954 marked the
year that the system moved from a rigid to
a loose structure. Consequently, the head
governmental leaders forced Djilas from

their ranks only after the international
system had moved from the strict, rigid bipolar system into a loose, changing bi-polar
system.
Until the international system
changed, creating greater insecurity for a
nation in the international arena, critics and
dissenters like Djilas worked with relatively
few constraints. However, once the system
changed, so did the internal politics of the
nation.
b. Greater freedom for change,
including that of the specific governmental
roles was permitted. Since the government
was in a transition mode during this time,
political actors were able to incorporate new
power and influence into their roles.
Especially since the government had just
been established, the nation did not possess
democratic traditions, and neither
superpower truly dominated the country, the
political actors were able to shape their role
with very little effort.
c. A strong, multi-party political
system flourished, although it existed within
the Communist Party.
Originally, this
system was led by two dominant groups, the
theoretical and pragmatists. Within the two
groups were several fractionalized offshoots, as well as multiple ethnicallypowered political groups. This diversity
continued until the government grew
insecure in the international system and
believed that, to remain powerful, it had to
consolidate its power within current leaders.
2. The international system from
1946 to 1948 can be characterized as a loose
multi-polar system since power was shared
by many nations, without domination by a
select one or two countries.
a. The national government followed
stringent domestic policies due to the lack of
international security. During these two
years, the Communist party was unified with
all high-level officials pursuing the same
national agenda.
Critics and dissenters
outside of the "legitimate" government were
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silenced, while those within the government
were either muffled or forgot their criticism
(pavlowitch 1971, 201).
b. The role replaced the individual
in importance, although the individual still
influenced the power associated with the
role. Tito's role as party and governmental
president had set parameters and limitations
which he could not challenge. This is
because his role had direct contact with the
international system and he could not take
the chance of upsetting the system by trying
to expand his power. Once the international
system became more rigid, he had fIrm,
committed international allies so he could
re-defIne his role. However, until this
happened, he had to work within the
constraints of his role.
c. The few high-level governmental
offIcials cemented their control. As a result
of the international insecurity, high-ranking
offIcials moved to close their ranks to
condense all power into their hands. As the
positioned leaders, they had a vested interest
in preserving their power and control so that
the nation would be unifIed and secure
enough to withstand the international
insecurity. This would happen only through
a firm maintenance of control over the
internal scene by the government (Clissold
1983, 201-202).
3.
From 1941 to 1945 the
international system was chaotic since the
World War did not allow any type of
security and the states maintained purely
necessitated alliances. 21
a. The Yugoslavic government was
authoritarian during this time since it had to
unify the country to fight the Germans.
Necessity demanded that any means to expel

the enemy be employed, so human rights
and democratic ideals were not priority
items for the government.
b. Within the resistance movement
itself, which recognized itself as the only
true government, role completely replaced
the individual in importance. This was
because the individual not only feared
international instability, but also national
instability so all actions had to be within the
parameters of their role so that the
government would not suspiciously watch
their every action.
c. Once the resistance leaders seized
power, they were reluctant to share power
with other actors that were not deemed
essential within the governmental
framework. Consequently, few others were
brought into the elite leadership; the small
number of leaders already in power
maintained complete control.
Conclusion

Within the field of foreign policy
analysis, there exists a tremendous gulf
between theory and country expertise.
While many theorists have attempted to
bridge this gulf, few have been successful.
It is imperative that more work be done to
integrate the two sectors of the field because
one does not offer a thorough and viable
explanation without the other. Although the
presented analysis and theory is little more
than an inexperienced attempt to combine
the two sectors, within the presented
information is a cause, an effect and a link
between the two. This is the type of work
which needs to be pursued so that the
inexplicable may become comprehensible.
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NOTES

1. Although he fought against Russia, Tito willingly gave his allegiance to the Russian
Communist movement. He felt no conflict because Tsar Alexander II's capitalistic
government led the country into World War II. So, in effect, Tito fought against an
imperialistic, pro-Western government and not against his brother Communists.
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2. The new government based its power on four sources of legitimacy, which are the
following:
1. Power per se.
2. International recognition and legal continuity with the old Yugoslavia.
3. The Partisan war as the national myth of political founding.
4. Moscow's recognition as the legitimate proletariat protector (Rusinow 1977, 13).
The third source was unique because it was based on the government's own power,
and not on the USSR's power. Ultimately, this power source gave the national government
enough confidence to place its goals and objectives for the state ahead of the world-wide
Communist goals advocated by Stalin.
3. The results of the election showed that 90% of the 74 million Yugoslav voters supported
the single list presented by the People's Front. Although there were no presented opposing
candidates, the voters could vote against the candidate (Rusinow 1977, 12-13).
4. In his book, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison used his organizational process model
to explain how individual actors will create power. The actors will use any means available
to expand their power base, cement their control, and further their role's parameters.
5. During Operation Weiss, and especially in the battle on the Neretva, in early 1943, Tito
rashly changed orders and battle plans. His premature decision to destroy a bridge across the
Neretva substantially impeded and complicated his troops withdrawal, endangering their
survival (Djilas 1980, 12).
6. Djilas, and other officials, often criticized this excessiveness.
7. Djilas' godfather, Mihailo Vickovic, impressed him by the fact that "he was a
Communist because he loved justice, like Christ", something which greatly appealed to his
gentle nature (Lustig 1989, 84).
8. Once Tito declared the Soviet-Yugoslavian separation, he began speaking of a new road
to socialism. He employed democratic rhetoric, praising some Western ideals, while
denouncing Stalinist Communism.
9. This relationship parallels that shared by Nixon and Kissinger throughout the Nixon
administrations. At times it was difficult for policy experts to determine which man was
actually leading the country because of Kissinger's active and dominating presence within
national and international policy making.
10. Part of Graham Allison's organizational process model explains how individual actors,
below the highest officials, will manipulate, change or even fabricate information. This
effectively makes subordinate actors the true policy makers since their agenda is followed
because of presented information.
11. Many would disagree with this statement, but consider the United States' President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his programs created by the New Deal. For the first time,
Americans paid an income tax and collected welfare benefits. Both economic programs must
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be accepted as socialistic in nature.
12. The classic example of this is Germany and the Weimar Republic. While Tito's
government was not necessarily moderate (as defined from a United States' perspective), the
actual national and international policies pursued by the government were indeed moderate,
Even the "shocking" land collectivization programs were not that different from the United
States' distribution of Japanese land during MacArthur's reign.
13. The unification of Yugoslavia was a tremendous task for any government. Especially
when considering the current Yugoslavic situation, it is amazing that any government
managed to unify, and preserve this unity, for more than thirty five years.
14. The pan-Slavic sentiments which helped bring Russia into World War I remained
through this point. Ethnicity transcended geographical lines once calls for Slavic
brotherhood and unity began.
15. Consider the power granted to France compared to her actual capabilities. No
reasonable or logical explanation exists for de Gaulle's equal standing among Roosevelt,
Truman, Stalin, and Churchill. Since the victorious powers, primarily the United States and
Great Britain, voluntarily credited De Gaulle (and others) with power because of anti-fascist
programs during the war, the international power scene was far from reflecting reality.
Partial reality, relative to actual power capabilities, set in only with the commencement of
the bi-polar structure.
16. This new form of communism became a type of socialism intertwined with democracy.
Many other Western European countries grasped some of the Yugoslav-promoted government
ideals and implemented them into their own government. For example, France's quick entry
into socialistic practices can be traced to Yugoslavic influences.
17. B. Sundelius, a country expert theorist, maintains that a nation's memory, i. e. an
inherent memory mechanism which links all national actions together, must be considered
when explaining any type of national action.
18. V. Hudson, et al. theorize that determining a government's primary internal opposition
must occur so that the international system may more clearly understand the conflict. Since
the 1948 conflict was initially viewed as a conflict within the Soviet system, this theory
explains why other nations had to determine whether Tito's insurgent movement was really
valid.
19. Hans Morganthau, as a representative of realism, would offer this explanation of the
conflict.
20. The two superpowers had cemented their alliances by this time and their respective
power and influence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commenced in 194849, while the Warsaw Pact was born in 1955. The Marshall Plan had incorporated most of
Western Europe, excluding Eastern Europe at Stalin's insistence. After the United States
"lost" China in 1950, ideology replaced all other issues in importance. Once this happened,
every national government had to pledge complete allegiance to either the United States or
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the USSR. There was no way to remain in both camps.
21. For example, the alliance between Stalin and Hitler was not made for any reason other
than short-term national interest. The same can be said for the relationship between the
Allies and Stalin. Obviously, the wartime system did not contain inherent stability and longterm allies.
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Unhealed Wounds: Japan's Colonization of Korea
Aaron Skabelund
had to endure at the hands of their former
colonizers. Was there something unique
about the colonization of Korea by Japan? If
so, what? Also, why have the political
wounds been so slow to heal between South
Korea and Japan? Will these bitter wounds
undermine the security alliance against the
rising nuclear threat of North Korea?
This paper will seek to answer these
questions. It will also examine how the
change of power in Japan from the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) to the coalition
government led by Morihiro Hosokawa has
affected Japan's political relationship with
South Korea.
When examining the history and
current situation, the significant role of
Japan is evident in causing the original
problems and not taking the necessary steps
since then to lessen the level of distrust.
Although South Korea is not free from
criticism, this paper will concentrate on
Japan's role in the development of the
political relationship with South Korea. A
detailed examination of Japan-North Korean
relations will be bypassed here except for its
current influence on the Japan-South Korean
political relationship, because North Korea's
relations with Japan have been plagued by
communism's influence as well as the
colonial legacy.

Introduction

Second only to English, Japanese is
the language most studied by Korean
students. Cultural and intellectual exchanges
between South Korea and Japan, separated
by only the narrow Korean Strait, are wide
and varied. Business is brisk between Japan,
the world's second largest economy, and
South Korea, a rising industrial power. In
fact, Japan is South Korea's largest source
of imports with 29% of all imports in 1990,
and the South's second largest export market
with 21 % of all exports in 1990 (Bridges
1992, 155). Despite the existence of the
usual trade imbalance in Japan's favor,
business and trade relations are healthy. The
two nations are also linked in a security
relationship via the United States, and both
have urged the United States to stay in Asia
as a stabilizing influence to balance China's
rising power, and especially to temper North
Korea's new nuclear threat. Looking at these
cultural, geographical, economic, and
security relationships between South Korea
and Japan, one might be led to think that
these two countries have a cozy and solid
relationship. However, history haunts Korea
and Japan.
Japan's colonization of Korea from 1910 to
1945 is the primary cause of this historical
legacy. Despite the tight cultural and
economic links, deep distrust is the still the
rule, not the exception, between the two
countries. For example, "[O]n the South
Korean side, Japan is usually placed as the
next most disliked country after North
Korea" (153).
Many other former colonies of
European imperialist powers have long since
forgiven, if not forgotten, the wrongs they

History

Japan's efforts to invade Korea were
not isolated to the modem era. In the late
15OOs, Japan's ruler, Hideyoshi, led an
invasion to take Korea, but he was
unsuccessful. Even today, this "invasion has
been emphasized in the historic memories of
the Koreans and still contributes to the
-47-

Pi Sigma Alpha Review - 1994
bitterness between them and the Japanese"
(Rei schauer 1990,65). However, during the
Tokugawa period from the early 1600s to
the mid-1800s, Japan maintained good
relations with the "hermit kingdom," as
Korea was sometimes called. Also, Japan
continued trading with Korea despite the
Tokugawa policy of isolationism that meant
a ban on almost all trade and contact.
Soon after the Meiji restoration in
1868, Japan contemplated an invasion of
Korea, but it was rejected in favor of
strengthening the new government and the
nation. The chief proponent of the invasion
was Saigo Takamori, a samurai of samurais,
who was so enthusiastic about the invasion
that he offered himself to be assassinated in
order to provide an excuse for the
aggression. Although the Meiji oligarchs
were hesitant about an immediate invasion
of Korea, they were confident enough to
force Korea out of isolation and into an
unequal treaty in the same manner that had
been dealt to them by Matthew C. Perry.
This action caused the beginning of a series
of showdowns between Japan and China,
and then Japan and Russia for control of the
"hermit kingdom. "
Japan came out the winner in 1905,
after defeating Russia to secure international
recognition of its supremacy in Korea.
Korea's fate was then completely sealed by
the Taft-Katsura Agreement with the United
States. It gave the United States free reign
in Philippines while "acknowledg[ing]
Japan's right to take appropriate measures
for the 'guidance, control, and protection' of
Korea" (Eckert, 238-39).
Japan immediately began to take
control of Korea that year. It forced Korea
to sign the Protectorate Treaty, which gave
Japan absolute authority to take "control and
direct the foreign relations and affairs of
Korea" by placing a Japanese residentgeneral just below the Korean emperor
(McKenzie 1969, 309). In 1907 the

emperor, Kojong, was tricked into
relinquishing the throne to his son, and by
1910 the Japanese had enough power to
coerce the son to resign and allow Japan to
annex Korea. Thus, the sovereignty of
Korea was gradually weakened by the
imperialist rivalries among the surrounding
countries, and then it was systematically
demolished by Japan.
There are three distinct factors that
were unique about the colonization of Korea
by Japan, as compared with other colonial
situations. First, Korea was an established
state with a monarchy that had reigned for
hundreds of years before its unquestioned
sovereignty was destroyed by Japan.
Second, Japan and its colony were closely
related by geography and culture. Third, the
colonization was marked by the usual
intensity and harshness politically, but there
was also an effort made to destroy Korea
culturally through forced assimilation.
Although each of these may not be entirely
unique as compared with other colonial
situations, the combination of the three made
the colonial experience especially severe for
the Korean people and is part of the reason
why it remains an issue even today.
Demolition of a Longtime Sovereign State
In contrast to many Western imperial
powers, Japan began its colonizing late.
Thus, when it took over Korea in 1910, the
Japanese:
did not have the luxury of carving out an
artificial state entity in a political vacuum.
They had to establish their control over an
ancient state and society with a long historical
experience and high degree of racial, ethnic,
cultural, and linguistic homogeneity. Moreover, responding to external pressures, Korea
had already begun the process of transforming
its traditional institutions, and in consequence
the annexation disrupted the indigenous political movement to create a modern Korean
nation-state. (Eckert 1990, 256)
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By "the land owned by the Japanese . . .
amounted to . . . about 60 percent of the
arable land" (Chan 1977, 54). Hundreds of
thousands of Japanese moved across the
Korea Strait to administer the colony, and
"as many as 4,000,000 people, an
astonishing 16 percent of the Korean
population was living" either in Japan or in
other parts of the Japanese empire (such as
Manchuria and Sakhalin) by 1944 (Eckert
1990, 322). These four million Koreans
were mostly laborers, but they also included
"comfort women," young women who were
forced by the Japanese Imperial Army
through kidnapping or trickery to become
prostitutes.
Cultural contiguity combined with
geographic proximity to deepen the wounds.
Japan and Korea, both recipients of Chinese
cultural influences, had many cultural
similarities. There is something uniquely
unsettling about being conquered by your
neighbor and then being ruthlessly exploited
by that nation.

Because of these well-established institutions
and traditions, Korea's opposition to the
takeover was stiff for the entire occupation.
This gave Japan the option to either try to
crush the resistance or assimilate the
Koreans. They tried both approaches, and
both produced frightening results for the
Koreans.
Geographic Proximity and Cultural
Contiguity
Japan was able to take over not via a
bloody invasion in a distant land but through
a series of quietly coercive treaties with a
neighbor. Unlike most colonized countries
that are thousands of miles from the
imperial power, Korea is located only about
one hundred miles from the Japanese island
of Kyushu. This geographic proximity
prompted Japan, which saw outside
dominance of Korea as "a dagger pointing at
Japan's heart," to take over its neighbor
(Bridges 1993, 8); and because of this
proximity, Japan was able to completely
dominate and integrate Korea into its
economic and political system.
The Japanese colonization of Korea
is also unique because it is one of the rare
examples of non-European colonialism in
modem times. Not only was Japan a nonEuropean country, it was a close neighbor
and was still a developing country. These
factors combined to make Japan's policies
(regarding Korea as well as Manchuria)
unlike those of the more developed, distant
Britain. Thus Japan's "control and use of its
colonies were much more extensive,
thorough, and systematic; the economic
structure of the colonies had to undergo
radical and brutal transformation tied to the
needs of rapidly growing Japan" (Woo
1991, 21).
This meant exploitation. Japan first
exploited Korea as a "rice basket" and then
as a source for natural and human resources.

Political and cultural repression
Japan's exploitation of Korea was
complete. It extended from economic to
political and cultural repression. Traditional
government in Korea had been somewhat
decentralized, but with Japanese rule came
increased centralization; even the most local
"trivial matters became issues of public
concern" (258). Also, "Japanese control was
as total as it was brutal . . . ; the Japanese
tried to crush the Korean national identity"
(Bridges 1990, 153). Political repression
was constant during the entire colonial
reign. By 1941, there was a combined
Japanese-managed, Korean-staffed police
force "of over 60,000 ... [that] represented
one policeman for every four hundred
Koreans" (Eckert 1990, 259). From the
beginning in 1910, "[T]he right of assembly
and of free speech were abolished; the
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holding of non-political public meetings and
the gathering of crowds out-of-doors were
also prohibited except for religious
gatherings or school excursions" (Ku 1985,
11).
Repression spread even to religion
and education. The Japanese used "State
Shinto or nationalistic Shinto ideology" as a
"so-called peaceful offensive" in Korea
(palmer 1977, 141) . Japanese was
established as the national language in
Korean schools, as was a Japanese dictated
curriculum. This "provided a mechanism.
.. to legitimate Japanese rule" and spread
Japanese [M]orals education, the
Japanization of Korean history and culture,
. . . the Japanese language and values that
subtly eroded Korean cultural identity and
confidence" (Eckert 1990,262-63). In 1939,
the Japanese passed an edict that strongly
pressured all Koreans to change their names
to Japanese-style surnames and given names.
By the end of the war, "over eighty-four
percent of the population complied with this
cruelly insensitive edict" (318). In this way,
because the Japanese chose to obfuscate
their policies with the rhetoric of benign
assimilation [the policies were] subtly
confusing and psychologically damaging. To
have cast off one's primary identify for that
of the colonizer demeaned Korean culture in
a profound way. It was, at bottom, a harsh
and brutal system of colonial rule. (319)

200 million dollars in low-interest loans,
while South Korea waived further claims for
war damages" (Mainichi, 30 August 1992).
So why is the colonial era still a political
issue between Japan and Korea? Of course,
history still lingers-the brutality inflicted by
a neighbor does not dissipate quickly. The
1965 treaty "included neither a formal
apology or a reparation clause" to account
for the colonial wrongs committed (Bridges
1993,11). There are also fears that Japan's
latest rise to power- economicallythreatens Korea and the rest of Asia with a
new kind of imperialism. However, there
are two more important contemporary
problems that exist. Both are connected, like
the fears of economic imperialism, to the
colonial period. First is the treatment of
Japan's largest minority population,
Koreans. Second is the denial of the
Japanese government of wrong doing in its
aggression against Asia, and in particular its
colonization of Korea, in the first half of the
century.
Koreans in Japan
According to the Japan Ministry of
Justice statistics, Koreans in Japan now
number about 680,000 (Hoffman 1991,
480), and they continue to be a sore spot
between Korea and Japan. These are
Koreans who chose not to return home after
the war. They are "[g]eographically
concentrated
and economically
restricted, they suffer from a number of
societal and legal disadvantages" (Bridges
1992, 157).
The Koreans in Japan have
continually been the victims of official and
unofficial discrimination. As part of Japan's
"benign assimilation," they were considered
Japanese nationals during the colonial
period, but like their fellow-Koreans on the
peninsula, they found Japanese promises
empty and life hard. After the Great Kanto

Contemporary Review of the Problem
The colonial period ended nearly
forty-eight years ago with Japan's defeat in
the Second World War. Almost thirty years
ago, in 1965, Japan and Korea signed a
treaty that normalized relations. The treaty
was adamantly opposed by many in both
countries. With the treaty, Japan and South
Korea legally settled all war claims. At that
time, Japan provided "South Korea with a
total of 300 million dollars in grants, and
-50-

Skabelund -- Japan's Colonization of Korea

Earthquake of 1923 that destroyed Tokyo,
they were the victims, along with Chinese
and socialists, of mob violence. It is
estimated that some six -thousand Koreans
were massacred in the days after the
earthquake (Mainichi, 1 September 1993).
While usually not so violent,
discrimination against Koreans has remained
government policy and is often backed by
popular feelings. Both are starting to
change. Michael Weiner wrote in 1989,
before the changes began to take place:

1993, 131-133). Also, although there have
been some substantive legal changes made
lately to end discrimination, the attitudes of
the Japanese public still lag far behind.
Japanese denial
In 1991, a group of elderly women
came forward after a half a century to tell
of being "forced to serve as 'comfort
women,' the euphemistic term used by
Imperial Japan" (Jones, 11 March 1993).
This was just another incident in a series
that showed how slow the wounds were to
heal. The Japanese had a history of
censoring what was published in the
nation's textbooks. Examples of
propaganda in Education Ministry
approved textbooks have raised
controversy, such as "references to 'antiJapanese resistance' in Korea bering]
changed to difficulties in obtaining 'the
Korean people's cooperation'" (Anger, 27
May 1993). Also the Korean leader in
1989, Roh Tee-woo refused to attend the
funeral of Japan's wartime emperor,
Hirohito (Fararo, 18 February 1989).
In the early nineties, the Japanese
tried to apologize, but at the same time
continued to deny that the army had
actually coerced the Korean and other
Asian women into sex-slavery. The LOP,
which had ruled Japan for over thirty
years, seemed to have no desire to dig up
old dirt. Its apologies, including those
made by Akihito, the new emperor and
Hirohito's son, in 1991, and by Prime
Minister Miyazawa in January 1992, were
undermined by the fact that it had taken so
long to face up to Japan's war guilt and
the apologies themselves were vague and
indirect. Even after Miyazawa admitted
that Japan had used "comfort women" he
continued to deny the use of force. This
evoked bitter reactions in South Korea,
who questioned "whether Japan is willing

Although the vast majority were born in Japan and
speak Japanese as their first language, relatively few
possess Japanese citizenship. Most are classified by the
Ministry of Justice as aliens, and Koreans compose
more than 85 % of the total foreign resident population.
This limits their legal rights in the broadest sense. (1)

In 1988, during Prime Minster Toshiki
Kaifu's visit to Korea, the Japanese finally
"agreed to replace the alien registration
system for Korean residents with a family
registration system by 1992" (Bridges 1992,
157). The most controversial step of the
previous system, the requirement for all
Japanese-Koreans to be finger-printed, was
finally dropped for most. But there is still
deep criticism that the new laws are only
cosmetic (Mainichi, 31 May 92).
The Japanese government has been
making progress on the Korean-Japanese
issue, but such criticism shows that it will
continue to be a source of controversy that
brings back colonial-era memories. Other
complaints include those about Koreans
deserted on the Russian-held island of
Sakhalin who are unable to return due to
political differences in the area (Mainichi,
23 December 1990); Korean victims of the
A-bombs dropped at the end of the war,
who have received almost no financial
compensation from the Japanese government
compared to Japanese victims; and for the
Korean women forced into prostitution for
Japanese soldiers during the war (Bridges
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to come to grips with its past, and whether
it can gain enough trust from its neighbors
to take a greater leadership role in the
world" (Blustein, 10 July 1992). Pressure
to apologize in Japan rose as well. Asahi
Shinbun, Japan's second largest newspaper
after the Mainichi, blasted the government,
declaring that:This is the time to squarely
face our troubled past blemishes . . . .
Otherwise, we will be repeating an
undesirable practice in Japanese
diplomacy-taking piecemeal measures
only when pressed. It will be impossible to
fraternize with other Asian nations as an
ordinary country without expressing our
genuinely national contrition" (13).
Nevertheless, Miyazawa only admitted to
"coercive action" on his final day in
office.

our children what their forefathers did in
waging war on the Asian continent"
(Schlesinger, 5 August 1993). The
government signaled its seriousness to put
its words into actions quickly "when only
four members of the new cabinet attended
annual ceremonies at Yasukuni shrine in
Tokyo to pay respects to Japan's war dead.
In 1992, when the LDP controlled the
government, 15 cabinet members attended"
and in 1985, LDP Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone even attended, which brought a
wave of criticism from Korea and other
countries (Bussy, 16 August 1993). In this
way, the coalition government is taking
steps toward warmer political relations with
Korea that match their strong economic ties.
Korea, who has always privately given
business ties priority while publicly
supporting its victims (such as the "comfort
women"), seems to have little to gain from
continued bitterness. However, the Japanese
government must continue to match its
words with the appropriate actions in such
areas as textbooks about the colonial period
and compensation for the former "comfort
women."

Change
The coalition government that forced
out the LDP for the first time in over thirty
years is headed up by Morihiro Hosokawa.
From the start, the new government made it
clear that it would act decisively without
being pressed. In a series of remarkable
statements that even went too far for some
within the coalition, Hosokawa apologized
again and again in a "simple and
straightforward" way uncharacteristic of the
LDP (Bussy, 16 August 1993). He called
the Second World War "a war of
aggression" (Jones, 13 August 93) and
added in a statement to the Diet that he
"would like to take this opportunity to
express our profound remorse and apologies
for the fact that Japan's actions, including
acts of aggression and colonial rule, caused
unbearable suffering and sorrow for so
many people" (Reid, 24 August 1993).
The new government also seems set
to be more open about the past in the
schools. Hosokawa's foreign mInIster,
Tsutomu Hata, stated that "We should tell

North Korea
Hosokawa and the new coalition
government's efforts to mend relations with
South Korea is also a response to the role of
a third player, North Korea. Primarily
because of ideology and security
arrangements, and secondarily because it is
further hampered by colonial memories,
Japan and the North have never been able to
establish relations. Several times the North
Koreans have met low-level Japanese
officials and made attempts toward relations,
but they have been unsuccessful partly due
the insistence of the North, and the South,
on an "either/or" type of policy. This means
that if Japan establishes relations with the
North, it must drop its relations with the
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South. There is no chance that Japan will do
this. However, North Korea's efforts to
develop nuclear weapons may test the
tenuous political relationship of South Korea
and Japan. This may be in part be why
Hosokawa is diligently seeking to resolve
lingering South Korean grievances.
Most likely the South KoreanJapanese alliance will hold strong, backed
by the military might of the United States.
However, there may still be problems that
have their roots in the colonial period. The
Koreans in Japan are far from united in their
support for the South in the duel over the
Korean peninsula. There is considerable
support for Kim II Sung and considerable
illegal trade and money-laundering between
the Korean-Japanese and the North. Money
generated from this trade "has allowed the
bankrupt North Korean government to build
its huge nuclear weapons complex" (Sanger,
1 November 1993).
As the nuclear facility inspection
crisis heated up in early 1994, it was
revealed that old Russian attack submarines
were being sold to the North via a Japanese
company owned by a Korean-Japanese
(Sanger, 20 January 1994). However,
Japanese officials are unenthusiastic about
cracking down on the exchange of money
between Korean-Japanese and the North
(especially the estimated $600 million to $2
billion supplied to family members and
government officials), or participation in an
embargo that would have the same effect.
The Japanese are "worried about causing.
.. 'an eruption'-perhaps including riots or
terrorism-among the roughly 150,000
Koreans [later estimated at 300,000] in
Japan who are sympathetic to Mr. Kim's
Government" (Sanger, 1 November 1993
[20 January 1994]). Such incidents would
certainly worsen Japan's already poor
relations with Koreans in Japan and also
with a concerned South Korea. Resolution of
this domestic problem, in order to meet

decisively and wisely with the North Korean
threat, requires that the Japanese
government work closely with the South
Korean government and the United States.
Conclusion

Two of the historical factors that
make the colonial period unique, the
violation of Korea's long held sovereignty
and the proximity and contiguity of the two
countries geographically and culturally, are
both products of situation, uncontrolled by
individuals or states. The imperialist drive
was an international tendency of the time
that may have influenced the rising Japan
(looking for new markets to keep the Meiji
industrial revolution rolling) to crush Korea
politically and economically. However,
Japanese imperialism into Asia was initiated
by a shift in government policy that changed
the emphasis from internal modernization
and industrialization to external expansion to
aid continued industrialization. Using the
favored vehicle of the era, Japan adapted
imperialism backed by militarism. The
almost complete cultural repression was a
government-led policy.
Japan was forced to open itself up to
outside influences with the Meiji restoration.
Then, as its industrial strength increased due
to adaptation and hard work, its confidence
grew and it sought expansion to foreign
markets and looked to become an
international power. The post-war period has
brought what many believe is a repeat of
that cycle in a new world system. Japan's
economic influence has expanded across the
world. It is now looking to become a world
political power. This has been initiated once
again by a shift in government policy, this
time due to an upset election that brought in
a new generation of younger, more
internationally-oriented leaders. Hosokawa is
seeking to change decades of LDP foreign
(and domestic) policy. Japan is looking to
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mend relations with South Korea (and other
Asian nations) so that Japan can once again
become a regional and world political
power. This time the means are not
imperialism and colonial exploitation, but
internationalism (great power politics) and
economic opportunism. The results are
different as well; now there is foreign aid,
financial compensation, and apologies.
For Japan to deal effectively with
regional challenges of the present, Japan
must face up to the past. In order to meet
the security challenges of the North Korean
nuclear threat, the Hosokawa-Ied coalition
government must continue to build stronger
relations with South Korea. Japan has
maintained that the 1965 treaty legally
provided for all compensation to South
Korea. Yet to symbolically, psychologically,
and politically heal the wounds and lead a
reluctant Japanese public to recognition of
its past wrongs and an end to current
prejudices, the Government needs to
continue take positive steps. Such steps as

direct monetary compensation for the
"comfort women"" (who continue to protest
in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul in
early 1994 [Associated Press, 27 January
1994]) and other groups such as the A-bomb
victims, completely fair treatment of the
Korean minority, and continued sincere
signs of Japanese contrition and recognition
of its past colonial policies are needed in
order to strengthen the relationship between
the two countries.
If Japan continues to
make progress in these areas, then South
Korea will have no excuse but to forgive if
not forget. While it may be well for the
Koreans to not entirely forget Japanese
aggression, it would be beneficial for both
countries if Korea stopped perceiving Japan
as its former colonial master, and thus a
current economic imperialist threat, and
instead saw Japan as a partner in
maintaining regional security and as a
valuable trading partner. Only then will the
colonial memories stop haunting Japan and
South Korea.
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Divining Peace From Political Terrorism in Mozambique:
A Case for Negotiating With Terrorists
Kevin Ellsworth
Introduction

Literature Review

Counter-terrorist efforts frequently
entail the narrow policy options of
repression, violent confrontation, and
retaliation. The United States' "no deals"
policy (Busby 1990, 1), for example, has
long been widely accepted and praised.
Often, however, these tactics are ineffective
and even detrimental to peace-making
efforts.
Consequently, broader counterterrorism strategies must be considered
which include concession and negotiation.
Mozambique's recent peace process and
several new theoretical frameworks support
the thesis that negotiation and concession are
effective means of divining peace from
political terrorism.
After a review of the relevant
literature, I expose the limits of the
traditional anti-terrorist approach by
discussing first the weaknesses inherent in
defining terrorism--weaknesses which tend
to prevent an effective resolution by
imposing narrow policy choices which
exclude concession and
negotiation.
Second, I introduce Mozambique's terrorist
organization, Renamo, and demonstrate that
it fulfills all facets of terrorism's traditional
definitions. Third, I demonstrate that in
spite of Renamo's terrorist character,
negotiation and concession have established
a peace which repression and retaliation
never provided.
Finally, I review two
conflict resolution theories which when
applied to counter-terrorism encourage
concession over repression and help explain
Mozambique's successful peace process.

A vast amount of literature IS
available concerning terrorism and its
contributing factors, especially by Jeffrey
Ross (1993) who synthesizes most previous
work on causal approaches to terrorism.
Substantial writings are also available which
attempt to define terrorism and document its
occurrences. Research is lacking, however,
which addresses negotiating with terrorist
organizations. Almost universally, scholars
and politicians prescribe a hard-line
approach of preemption, repression, violent
confrontation, and sometimes retaliation
when confronting terrorist organizations.
Available research regarding negotiations
deals primarily with isolated terrorist
incidents such as hijackings, kidnappings,
and hostage situations (Atkinson, Sandler
and Tschirhart 1987; Ochberg 1985; Roukis
Such
1983; and Zartman 1990).
negotiations do not address the terrorist
organization as a whole or the possibility of
a lasting peace.
These studies are useful when applied
in some situations, but they do not deal with
resolving the deeper ills of terrorism. The
hard-line approach is effective when dealing
with smaller, manageable cases of terrorism,
but many nations are confronting terrorism
on a much grander scale, a scale which calls
for a different approach. The hard-line
approach is ineffective and detrimental in
third world nations where governments have
neither the military resources nor political
capital to address terrorism in the hard-line
fashion, such as in Peru, Sri Lanka, and
Mozambique, or in first world nations
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confronted by well armed and organized
terrorist organizations, as in the United
Kingdom, Italy, and Israel.
Literature regarding political violence
in general is abundant, but terrorism is
something of a unique breed which has not
been sufficiently addressed. Terrorism's
perceived immoral component has
encouraged anti-terrorist policy to bypass
relevant conflict resolution analysis, causing
governments to sometimes wage losing
battles rather than seek peace through
compromise and negotiation. Once the
scope of policy options is broadened beyond
the moral constraints of the anti-terrorist
tradition, several studies on general political
violence apply directly to situations like
Mozambique's (Gupta, Singh, and Sprague
1993; and Lichbach 1987).
Regarding Mozambique's peace
process, much has been written to document
the conflict (Finnegan 1992; Hanlon 1991;
Morgan 1990; and Hoile 1989). However,
only Alden and Simpson (1993) have tried
to analyze the peace process, but they focus
primarily on the factors which brought the
warring sides to the negotiating table and the
history of the negotiations. They fail to
generalize any theoretical implications of the
Mozambican case study, or discuss the
implications of successful negotiations with
terrorists.

definitions have emerged such as the
following:
•

Violent, criminal behavior designed
primarily to generate fear in the
community, or a substantial segment
of it, for political purposes (National
Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals 1976,
3).

•

Symbolic action designed to
influence political behavior by
extranormal means entailing the use
or threat of violence (Thornton 1964,
71-99).

•

The culturally unacceptable use or
threat of violence directed toward
symbolic targets to influence political
behavior whether directly through
fear , intimidation or coercion, or
indirectly by affecting attitudes,
emotions, or opinions (Field and
Estes 1985).

Even with relatively specific definitions, the
problem of application is still evident.
Depending on one's moral or political
perspective, such diverse organizations as
the Irish Republican Army, the Nicaraguan
Contra's, or the United Nations in Iraq
could all fit these definitions.
To clarify this ambiguity, policy
makers often add a moral component to
their definition of a terrorist. This moral
distinction is, however, neither operative nor
practical.
Instead, it complicates the
resolution process by sanctioning policies
based more on subjective moral judgments
than on an objective reality. The results are
sometimes devastating and war rages where
peace might otherwise be created. To
demonstrate this point, I will use the last
above-mentioned definition of terrorism to
show that Mozambique's terrorist force is a

Denning Terrorism
The first step in seeking more
effective anti-terrorist policies, is inspecting
terrorism's inherently vague definition and
the resulting vague label of terrorist. Many
scholars have struggled to compose a
comprehensive and exclusive definition for
terrorism, but they continually confront
numerous gray areas between terrorism and
what may also be perceived as civil war,
international aggression, governmental
oppression, or armed revolution. Many
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model terrorist force in the traditional sense,
and consequently a standard against which to
measure the failure of traditional counterterrorism efforts and the success of a
negotiated peace.

Symbolic Targets
When Mozambique gained its
independence in 1974 and the new Frelimo
government came to power, the country
desperately needed educational and health
care facilities, so one of Frelimo's first
efforts was to construct hundreds of schools
and health centers. These institutions soon
came to represent the government in the
minds of many Mozambicans, and therefore
became excellent symbolic targets in the
minds of Renamo. Between 1980 and 1988
alone, Renamo "rendered incapable" 1,800
schools and 720 health care facilities (Vines
1991, 17).
Another significant target had been
Mozambique's economy. By targeting the
economy, Renamo not only weakened the
government, but it also symbolically
attacked the government's strength and
sovereignty. To disrupt an already weak
economy, Renamo incapacitated 900 stores
and 1,300 trucks and busses (Vines 1991,
17).
Many roads were completely
impassable and the railroads were under
constant threat. Because the threat was so
serious, neighboring Zimbabwe posted
10,000 troops along the Mozambican
railways it used in order to protect
Zimbabwe's economic interests.
By 1990 Renamo's attacks had cost
Mozambique $15 billion (Schneidman 1991,
1) , and forced the government to spend
approximately 40 percent of its budget on
defense (Morgan 1990, 617). In 1990
Mozambique was designated by the "World
Bank as the world's poorest country, with a
GNP per capita of just $100" (Meldrum
1992, 29). Sixty percent of its people live
in absolute poverty, meaning they lack
adequate nutrition "even though 60 percent
of their total income is spent on food"

Mozambique's Terrorist Organization
The Mozambican terrorist
organization, known as the Mozambican
National Resistance or Renamo, fits the last
above-mentioned definition of terrorism in
every aspect:
•
•
•
•
•

Renamo uses culturally unacceptable
force
Directed toward symbolic targets
In an attempt to influence political
behavior
By use of direct fear, intimidation,
and coercion
And indirect influence over attitudes,
emotions, and opinions.
Culturally Unacceptable Force

During 17 years of war against
Mozambique's government, Renamo has
killed hundreds of thousands of
Mozambicans to consolidate their power and
create an atmosphere of terror. In their
widely publicized Romoine Massacre,
Renamo murdered 424 people including
many who were bedridden in a hospital and
new born infants. "Almost half [of the
victims] were women," and many were
children (Van Koevering 1987, 43).
Smaller but similar attacks occurred
frequently. Overall, Renamo killed as many
as 100,000 people and indirectly caused the
deaths of another 600,000 to one million
(Perlez 1992, I[A]) and (Ayisi 1989, 60).
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(Chelala 1992, 19). Many felt that the
economic devastation was so massive that
"development [would] not begin until the
rebels [were] either destroyed or
incorporated into the country's government"
(Huffman 1992, 27).

Ifluence over Attitudes, Emotions, and
Opinions
At first, these atrocities led
Mozambique's general population to hate
Renamo which prevented Mozambique's
government from compromlSlng with
Renamo. As the war waged on, however,
this attitude began to soften. Renamoinduced starvation, for example, had a
substantial impact on the Mozambicans'
attitudes.
In 1992, four million Mozambicans
were under threat of starvation (Matonse
1992, 29) due mostly to "terrorist
activities," which had forced farmers from
their land and severed many transportation
routes (U.S. Congress, House 1988, 7). By
creating an atmosphere of hopelessness
through extreme poverty, starvation, and
fear, Renamo has imposed upon the
Mozambican people a weariness and
readiness for compromise.
A former
Frelimo supporter articulated the general
feeling of many desperate Mozambicans, "I
don't even care anymore what kind of
government we have, just so long as we
have peace" (Meldrum 1992,32). One man
released from a rebel-held area stated his
highest hopes saying, "Maybe we will be
able to move a little bit now and search for
food ... " (perlez 1992, 1[A]). By 1992
starvation and desperation had driven both
sides to negotiate a settlement.

Attempts to Influence Political Behavior
Since its birth, Renamo has been a
political actor. The white-minority ruled
Rhodesian government originally established
Renamo to destabilize and discredit
Mozambique's black-ruled,
Marxist
government. Since Rhodesia's demise and
South Africa's withdrawal from the
Mozambican conflict, Renamo has now
resorted to consolidating military and
political power for itself.
Use of Fear, Intimidation, and Coercion
The Mozambican people lived in
constant fear that they would fall victim to
Renamo's unpredictable attacks, a fear
Renamo intentionally cultivated. Renamo
sometimes cut off the ears, nose, and lips of
their victims and then allowed them to live
as a source of warning and fear to all who
saw them (perlez 1992, 13 October, 8[A]).
Renamo also coerced villages to provide
Renamo with food and manpower--men and
boys as young as thirteen years were forced
to join Renamo's ranks.
The coercion did not end once these
men were compelled into service. Under
threat of death, Renamo forced the
kidnapped recruits to fight with them
(Minter 1989, 18).
One reporter
interviewed 32 Renamo terrorists and
thirteen of which "had personal knowledge
of the execution of Renamo combatants who
tried to escape" (Minter 1989, 19). One
escaped Mozambican claimed "the first thing
they tell you is that if you try to escape,
we'll kill you" (Ottaway 1992, 25[AD.

The Peace Process
The negotiating process formally
began in July 1990 when Mozambique's nowin predicament had become evident and the
Frelimo government began bargaining
directly with Renamo. After many
concessions and compromise, on 4 October
1992 the Frelimo government and Renamo
signed a peace treaty officially ending the 17
year war. The peace negotiations made it
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clear that "while the Chissano
[Mozambique's current president]
government is opposed to many of
Renamo's demands, it is losing the will to
argue about principles while its
administration is rapidly collapsing"
(Meldrum 1992, 32).
Consequently, Mozambique's
government has been forced to make some
very substantial compromises.
It is
currently revising the national anthem
(Zandamela 1993), and it agreed to change
the country's name from the People's
Republic of Mozambique to the Republic of
Mozambique.
Other major concessions
include the following:

•

•
•

needs to create a stable political environment
which will secure a lasting peace.
There is still room for skepticism
concerning the durability of the peace,
especially given the slow pace of troop
demilitarization. But overall the process has
been surprisingly successful in preparing for
long term peace. This success demonstrates
itself in a number of ways.
War Fatigue
One of the most positive factors
contributing to the peace process is the
nation-wide weariness of war and desire for
peace. On the first year anniversary of the
peace accord Aldo Ajello, UN special
representative to Mozambique, announced
that "Mozambique had enjoyed a year
without fighting" and claimed that because
the Mozambican people had tasted peace "it
would be hard for either side to go back to
war" (BBC World Service 1993).
As a result of this war fatigue, both
sides of the conflict have supported the
peace process and solicited international
support for peace. Both President Joaquim
Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo's
leader, have visited many foreign capitals in
order to solicit assistance. Consequently,
the peace process has received international
attention and substantial United Nations
assistance.

Complete political asylum for all
Renamo soldiers (a significant
compromise considering many
citizens view these men as ruthless
murderers) .
The establishment of a unified armed
forces made up equally by the
government and the rebels.
UN supervised elections with
Renamo as a legitimate contender for
the country's leadership.

The crucial question remains: Will
these compromises payoff? Will they
provide the peace that Mozambique desires
or will the country relapse into war? More
than one year into the peace process,
evidence is emerging for much optimism.

UN Peacekeeping Efforts
Because all sides of the conflict agree
on the need for international assistance, they
have opened the door for substantial UN
involvement. One opposition party leader
stated that "the United Nations has a great
deal of influence, and we can say that the
Mozambican people have been very lucky"
(Radio Mozambique Network 1993, 7 June,
1030).
Even Renamo's president has
"appealed for greater UN involvement in

Factors of Hope
So far the peace accord has been an
overwhelming success. Almost immediately
after the peace accord was signed the
fighting stopped (perlez, 16 October, 8[A]),
and there has been very little violence since.
For the peace process to be considered truly
successful, however, much more than
temporary peace is needed; Mozambique
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order to prevent a repetition of what has
happened in Angola" (Radio Mozambique
Network 1993, 4 October, 05(0).
The UN effort, entitled the United
Nations Operations in Mozambique
(UNOMOZ), began with a small token force
of only 25 peacekeepers (pedez 1992, 16
October, 8[A]) , but quickly increased to
6,200 by the end of May 1993. (Radio
Mozambique Network, 28 May, 1030). The
UN effort has solicited widespread
international support; currently twenty-four
nations are participating in UNOMOZ
(Radio Mozambique Network, 28 May,
1030).
The United Nation's involvement is
not however limited to peacekeeping
activities. The UN has also agreed to fund
Renamo with $10 million to assist its
transition to a political party (Radio
Mozambique Network 1993, 20 May,
1730), and UNICEF is providing an
education for many displaced children
(Radio Mozambique Network 1993, 8 June,
1100).

Several governmental policies are
facilitating troop demobilization. To enable
many of the troops to demobilize, they are
given three months wage to help them start
a new life (Baloi 1993, 23). Some troops,
however, are not being paid, and observers
fear that disgruntled troops might resort to
banditry. A few incidents support this
concern, but others contradict it. One
demobilized soldier claimed "the most
important thing is that I am going home. I
was tired of fighting. With or without
money, the fact is that I will be at home"
(Baloi 1993, 26). Furthermore, to ease the
transition the government is offering
abandoned farm land to demobilized soldiers
(Channel African Radio 1993).
Reintegrating twenty thousand
Renamo rebels into society could be
especially difficult for personal and social
reasons.
Many Renamo soldiers have
known no other life but war, so adjustment
will be difficult. Fortunately, Renamo's
character should make demobilization easier.
Renamo differs from other terrorist or rebel
forces in that many of the members support
Of 32 Renamo
Renamo unwillingly.
soldiers interviewed, only one claimed he
belonged to Renamo for ideological reasons
(Minter 1989, 18).
When given the
opportunity, many escape. In 1988 the
government offered amnesty to anyone who
left Renamo, and 3,000 accepted.
In addition to Renamo troops'
adjustment, Mozambican society may also
have difficulties with Renamo' s
demobilization.
Of 170 Mozambican
refugees interviewed, 91 % felt very
negatively toward Renamo (Huffman 1992,
116). Fortunately, war fatigue has made
this a somewhat moot point. The general
feeling among Mozambicans is that they can
accept Renamo troops and work with them
to start their lives together anew (Zandamela
1993).

Troop Demobilization
Piet Kruger, UNOMOZ coordinator
in charge of troop demobilization, estimated
there were originally 80 to 100 thousand
active Frelimo and Renamo soldiers (Radio
Mozambique Network 1993, 8 June, 1100).
Demobilizing these soldiers is a monumental
task which Aldo Ajello claims is one of
Mozambique's most crucial problems (Radio
Mozambique Network 1993, 15 October,
1030).
Unfortunately, by the first
anniversary of the peace accord, when
elections were originally planned to be held,
"neither side has demobilized a single
soldier or handed in a single weapon" (BBC
World Service 1993). By January 1994,
however, 8,340 Frelimo and 5,400 Renamo
troops had been demobilized (MEDIAF AX
1994, 2).
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Troop Integration

Network 1993, 29 October, 14(0).
Although Chissano and Dhlakama
still disagree on many issues, they have been
able to build a close personal relationship
which is very beneficial to the peace
process. Dhlakama said that "the two of us
have had conversations, and we often tell
jokes and laugh" (Radio Mozambique
Network 1993, 22 October, 1730). UN
Representative Ajello also voiced his
approval stating "he was pleased with the
atmosphere" the two leaders were creating
and the real understanding they were
forming between them (Radio Mozambique
Network 1993, 22 October, 1730).

Another potential source of conflict
is likewise rapidly diminishing--the creation
of the Armed Defense Forces of
Mozambique composed of 15,000 soldiers
from each party. On August 16, 1993 the
first 100 men (50 from each side) were sent
to a leadership training base in Nyanga,
Zimbabwe. Several weeks into the training,
the integration showed signs of success.
Soldiers who had been shooting at each
other just months earlier were "working,
eating, and living together" apparently with
no conflict (TEMPO 1993, 10-12). Most
observers could not perceive any differences
among the men at all.
A former government soldier, who at
first doubted the plan's potential for success,
claimed later to "feel very good about it."
A former Renamo soldier claimed the
experience was "very constructive." In
October, another 440 soldiers joined the first
100, and together these 540 soldiers were
prepared to train and lead the 30,000 man
unified army (TEMPO 1993, 10-12). By
February 21, 1994 the first six battalions of
700 men each were to report for this
training (Radio Mozambique Network 1994,
2 February, 1730).

Miscellaneous Factors
Several miscellaneous aspects of
Mozambique's current status cause one to
question whether overcoming such great
problems is possible. For example, the
economy is still a shambles, and millions of
Mozambicans are still displaced or living as
refugees abroad who must be reintegrated
into society and the economy. Malawi alone
harbors almost one million refugees
(Huffman 1992, 114).
Furthermore,
Mozambique's infrastructure is still mostly
unusable, due to an estimated two million
land mines (Radio Mozambique Network
1993, 18 May, 1030).
In contrast to these problems,
hundreds of refugees are coming home and
being successfully reintegrated.
Approximately 1.5 million who were
displaced abroad and domestically have
returned to their homes with very few
problems (Radio Mozambique Network
1993, 19 October, 1030), a sign "that the
people believe that peace has come to
stay ... " (Engineering News 1993, 36).
Furthermore, the destruction of the
economy has stopped, and more
importantly, Mozambique is creating the
political stability that will help the economy

Building Trust
Before demobilization can begin in
full force, a certain amount of mutual trust
is necessary. "Reflecting on a year of peace
in Mozambique, Aldo Ajello admitted there
was one obvious cause for regret--a total
failure to build trust between the two sides"
(BBC World Service 1993).
Soon
thereafter, however, the two parties made
agreements" which caused Ajello to claim
that the "peace machine is working at full
speed," and that "the government and
Renamo are slowly overcoming their
mistrust of each other" (Radio Mozambique
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grow. Prospects of economic development
are even brighter considering that all sides
of the conflict are working together to
encourage economic development.
Dhlakama now pleads for the reconstruction
of "shops, schools, hospitals, roads, and
bridges" which he has spent the last two
decades destroying (Radio Mozambique
Network 1993, 21 May 1030). South
Africa's Engineering News claims that "as
peace takes hold in Mozambique after
almost 30 years of war, so optimism is
taking hold. Foreign investors and tourists
are flooding back to the country to rebuild
its infrastructure. . . " (36). Already 200
foreign investors have begun projects with
Mozambique, and several major
corporations including Coca Cola and
Colgate-Palmolive are strongly considering
seIzmg business opportunities there
(Southern African Economist 1993, 22 and
23).

understanding and reacting to terrorism are
insufficient and counterproductive in some
situations.
Abandoning previous
assumptions does not, however, leave policy
makers without a foundation for analysis and
action. Instead, a multitude of theoretical
conflict resolution models may be refined
and applied to address political terrorism.
Two conflict resolution theories, in
particular, demonstrate concepts of general
political violence that are easily applied to
terrorist violence: the research of Mark
Lichbach (1987) and Dipak Gupta, Harinder
Singh, and Tom Sprague (1993). The two
theories explore the relationship between
governmental coercion and the magnitude
and quality of political dissent--a relationship
crucial to political terrorism.
Jeffery Ross alludes to the
importance of this relationship in his causal
study of oppositional terrorism. Among
terrorism's precipitant causes (as opposed to
structural causes), he ranks grievances as the
most influential (320). Among potential
grievances, he discusses legal grievances
which closely parallel Lichbach's and
Gupta's concept of governmental coercion or
repression (Ross 1993, 325). Lichbach and
Gupta et al.have expounded greatly on this
relationship.
Mark Lichbach (1987) reviews
several debated relationships between
governmental repression (indicated as
increasing with the X-axis) and political
violence (indicated as increasing with the Yaxis), and considers four different models
signified in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Traditional anti-terrorism approaches would
endorse the model shown in Figure 2, which
prescribes more coercion to stop political
violence, but Lichbach suggests another
theory. He believes that "an increase in a
government's repression of nonviolence will
reduce the nonviolent activities of an
opposition group but increase its violent

Evaluating the Peace Accord's Success
Although the debate over the peace
accord's success cannot yet be completely
settled, most indicators point toward a
successful conclusion to the peace process.
Even if the worst case materializes and the
country plunges back into war,
Mozambicans will have experienced more
than a year of peace they would not have
enjoyed otherwise. At the very best, 15
million Mozambicans can live out their lives
in peace.
Theoretical Application of
Mozambique's Case Study: Negotiating
with Terrorists
One lesson that may be extracted
from the Mozambican experience, is that
policy makers should sometimes cast off the
dogmatic hard-line approach. They should
accept that traditional methods of
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activities" (Lichbach 1987, 266). According
to his model, the traditional reaction to
terrorism--repression and non-negotiation-would increase, not lessen terrorist violence.
Grupta etal.
(1993) analyze this same
relationship between coercion and political
dissent by graphing the relationship of
empirical data they collected. They also
break down the analysis between democratic
and non-democratic nations, and between
violent and less violent political dissent.
They summarize their fmdings in the table
found in Appendix 1 (335).
Considering that political terrorist
violence contains many of the qualities
measured in the Political Instability
Quotient, deaths from domestic group
violence, and armed attacks, Gupta, Singh
and Sprague's conclusions may also be
applied to the effect of governmental
repression on terrorist violence.
Their findings generally depict two
relationships:
a positive relationship
(similar to Figure 1) for democracies, and
an inverted U relationship (similar to Figure
4) for nondemocracies.
This second
relationship seems to indicate that increasing
governmental repression in a nondemocratic
country may sometimes lessen terrorist
violence. Gupta et al. admit, however, that
few countries sufficiently coerce their
citizens to place the relationship on the
negatively sloped side of the graph. Most
regimes find themselves on the positively
sloped side of the graph where increasing
coercion increases political instability (323).
Therefore, except for a few extremely
coercive nondemocratic governments, all of
Gupta's findings agree with Lichbach's
claim that increased governmental coercion
only increases political violence (the positive
relationship found in Figure 1).
Each of these theories accurately
explains the success of Mozambique's peace
As the government began to
process.
negotiate with Renamo, the government's

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4
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coercive effect was drastically reduced.
Consequently, and as both models had
predicted, political violence declined.

which may confirm or rebut the wisdom of
negotiating with terrorists. The first is the
newly publicized negotiations between the
United Kingdom's government and Sinn
Fein, the political arm of the IRA. The
second is the ongoing negotiations between
Israel and the PLO. In each of these cases,
however, significant extra-governmental
coercion plays a role which should also be
considered as part of the coercion-violence
relationship.
Further study will also be needed
regarding the Mozambican peace process as
it continues to develop. Events in the
coming year, the elections next October, and
the adjustment period thereafter will paint a
more complete picture of the effects reduced
governmental coercion have on political
violence. For the present time, however,
the peace process appears to be successful,
and negotiating with terrorists is in this
instance a successful counter-terrorist
approach.

Conclusion
In Mozambique an unconventional
approach to terrorism has been successful,
but this should not be surprising.
By
examining ambiguous definitions of
terrorism and viewing two conflict
resolution theories in the terrorist context,
one finds that untraditional approaches may
prove very successful in other situations
similar to Mozambique's.
Further study is still needed before
this conclusion can be more generally
applied. Mozambique's unique political
situation, the magnitude of the conflict, the
willingness of Renamo to negotiate, and the
willingness of the international community
to assist the negotiation all play a vital role
in the peace. Two historic opportunities lie
before the scholarly community at this time
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APPENDIX 1

Summary Results of Relations Between Repression and Dissident Activities

Regime Type l

Overall PI~

Deaths from
Domestic Group
Violence

Armed Attacks

Protest
Demonstrations

Democracies

Insignificant

Positive

Positive

Positive

Democracies
(Gurr)

Insignificant

Positive

Positive

Positive

Nondemocracies

Inverted U

Inverted U

Inverted U

Insignificant

Nondemocracies
(Gurr)

Inverted U

Inverted U

Indeterminate

Indeterminate

2

Note that two definitions of democracies and nondemocracies were used (the second offered by Ted
Gurr) which offered only slightly differing results concerning armed attacks and protest demonstrations
in nondemocracies.
"Political Instability Quotient" takes into account the number of political demonstrations, riots, political
strikes, deaths from political violence, assassinations, armed attacks, political executions, and attempted
coups d'etat.
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